We Still Need to Kill Bin Laden

9/11's Unfinished Business
USA Today
September 11, 2009

In the eight years since 19 al-Qaeda terrorists struck at America's heart, the nation has taken significant strides both here and abroad to make its citizens safer.

Security around everything from ports to pipelines to jetliners has been hardened. Intelligence agencies are vigilant in a way that was tragically lacking before Sept. 11, 2001.

The government has disrupted the terrorists' financial networks and imprisoned Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the reputed tactical mastermind behind the attacks. The military has eliminated al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, and Predator drones have taken out dozens of terrorists along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Yet amid all the success in weakening the al-Qaeda network, vulnerabilities remain, and one gaping piece of unfinished business stands out. Osama bin Laden and his partner, Ayman al-Zawahri, remain at large.

After 9/11, getting bin Laden seemed the only way to redress at least some of America's anger and hurt. But as the pain of that awful day has receded, so too has the urgency of bringing him to justice. (In a Fox News Poll in July, only 50% said the U.S. should attempt to assassinate bin Laden, down from 66% soon after 9/11.)

The excuses and rationalizations are plentiful: He's only one man, and one man is hard to find. He's weakened and in seclusion. If eliminated, he'd just be replaced. Al-Qaeda has splintered into a fractured network of franchises. Even in the Muslim world, its popularity is sinking: In Pakistan, a recent Pew Global Attitudes poll found that support of the terrorist group had plummeted to 9%.

Yet no matter what the state of al-Qaeda, the importance of getting the organization's leaders should not be downplayed. Bin Laden is the person most responsible for the collapsing New York skyline, the battered Pentagon and a smoldering hole in the Pennsylvania countryside. For would-be terrorists, he is inspirational proof that you can get away with mass murder.
The trail has gone cold since the U.S. botched an effort to get bin Laden in late 2001 in Afghanistan's Tora Bora region. The Times of London reported this week that a small band of CIA operatives and special operations officers remains on the hunt in Pakistan, where bin Laden is thought to be hiding.

Unrelenting pursuit is essential. For Islamic extremists, bin Laden's death or capture would deprive them of their charismatic leader. For the nearly 3,000 people who died on 9/11, it would bring justice. And for all other Americans, it would reinforce the message that anyone who attacks the USA will be hunted to the ends of the earth.

Afghan Election Antics or Comedy Central??

U.S. Walks Fine Line In Afghan Vote

By Anand Gopal and Matthew Rosenberg
Wall Street Journal
August 31, 2009

The U.S. and its allies are walking a thin line by trying to monitor the count in Afghanistan's presidential vote without influencing the outcome, as results from the election trickle into public view.

Rampant allegations of electoral fraud, combative statements from candidates, and po! pular speculation about the U.S.'s role as kingmaker have made the balancing act more difficult.

According to the latest results, released Saturday, President Hamid Karzai's lead has widened, with votes from a third of the polling stations counted. At stake in the vote is not just the credibility of the new Afghan government, but also that of the U.S. and its allies, who have backed the democratic experiment with troops on the ground, say Western diplomats.

"If Afghans don't believe in these elections, then the international community will have failed here," said a European diplomat in Kabul.

Meetings between Western officials and Afghan presidential candidates have fed talk of efforts to shape a runoff between the two lead candidates, President Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah. In this context, an Aug. 21 meeting between Mr. Karzai and U.S. regional envoy Richard Holbrooke has also assumed importance, if only to highlight the prominent American role in the el! ection.

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has said its only preference i s for a fair election. "We do not support or oppose any particular candidate, and whether there is a runoff is an issue for the Afghan electoral bodies to determine," the embassy said.

Saturday's results show Mr. Karzai has 46.2%, up three percentage points from earlier in the week and well ahead of the 31.4% obtained by Dr. Abdullah, a former foreign minister and the lead challenger -- but still short of the absolute majority needed to avoid a runoff.

The two million votes already counted represent one-third of Afghanistan's polling stations. The electoral commission said it will provide the next update Monday.

Fraud allegations have marred the election. Afghan and international observers say supporters of both candidates stuffed ballot boxes and intimidated voters. Critics of Mr. Karzai say his camp engaged in more widespread fraud, if only because there were fewer monitors in parts of the country where his support is strongest, and the Taliban insurgency! is at its most potent. The Karzai campaign denies engaging in any fraud.

The independent Electoral Complaints Commission had received more than 2,000 allegations of misconduct through Saturday. Nearly 700 were considered serious enough to affect the outcome, the commission said.

Dr. Abdullah has repeatedly said he will dispute the results only through legal means. At the same time, he has said Mr. Karzai can win only through "big fraud," and has presented photos and videos of alleged ballot-stuffing in favor of Mr. Karzai.

Over the weekend, Dr. Abdullah offered a bleak outlook for the country if people don't accept the election results. "If the democratic process does not survive, then Afghanistan doesn't survive," he told hundreds of supporters at a rally north of Kabul Friday.

Such talk, along with private suggestions from some in Dr. Abdullah's camp that a Karzai win could be met with violent protests, has prompted U.S. and European officials to ! press the doctor to rein in his people. Dr. Abdullah's comments are "s omething that certainly worries all of us. It's not at all helpful at this moment," said a U.S. diplomat in Kabul.

As the vote count becomes more contentious, the U.S. and its allies are finding it harder to play a hands-off role. Over the weekend, U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown called Dr. Abdullah to discuss the elections, according to Abdullah campaign spokesman Fazel Sangcharaki.

"The British were very concerned about the possibility of violence," said Mr. Sangcharaki. "But they were careful not to suggest anything to us except for asking us to respect the legal process."

The U.K. Embassy in Kabul didn't respond to requests to comment.

A meeting the day after the Aug. 20 vote between Mr. Karzai and Mr. Holbrooke, who was accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry and another senior American official, illustrated the delicacy of the U.S. role. U.S. and Afghan officials with knowledge of the meeting described it as tense but not especi! ally heated. The Americans raised concerns about electoral fraud. They avoided pointing fingers at the president, but urged Mr. Karzai's government to address endemic corruption, if he were indeed re-elected, according to people with knowledge of the meeting. Mr. Karzai and Mr. Holbrooke met again Sunday to discuss many of the same issues, these officials said.

But the exchange quickly became part of Afghanistan's political folklore, spun by some into a shouting match in which Mr. Karzai stormed out of the room -- a scenario both U.S. and Afghan officials deny. Supporters of Mr. Karzai painted it as a U.S. attempt to force the rightful winner into a runoff. Opponents sought to portray it as another sign that the president, who came to power with the backing of the Bush administration, has lost Washington's backing and could no longer effectively govern.

Indians Orbit Moon 3,400x as US struggles to get Shuttles off the ground

India loses radio contact with moon orbiter
NEW DELHI, India (CNN) -- Indian space scientists were scrambling Sunday to regain contact with their unmanned moon mission a day after they abruptly lost contact with the orbiter.

System failures on the Chandrayaan-I apparently led to loss of contact, said S. Satish, a spokesman for the Indian Space Research Organization.

The craft was equipped with what officials said were highly-sophisticated gadgets.
"We are trying to revive the contact, but chances are slim," Satish said.

The space organization had originally announced that Chandrayaan-I would stay in orbit for two years. "That probably was a mistake because such craft do not have this much life," Satish said.

However, Chandrayaan-I had met most of its scientific objectives by providing "large volume of data," the space organization said. In 312 days, it completed more than 3,400 orbits around the moon, according to the space organization.

Chandrayaan-I aimed to take high-resolution, three-dimensional images of the lunar surface, especially the permanently-shadowed polar regions.

The craft carried payloads from the United States, the European Union and Bulgaria. One of its objectives was to search for evidence of water or ice and attempt to identify the chemical composition of certain lunar rocks.

Earlier this year, the Indian government increased the federal budget for space research to about $1 billion from $700 million.

Massive Voter Fraud by Karzai

No Sign Of Voters On Election Day In Afghanistan Despite Official Claims
By Tom Coghlan, in Pul-e-Charki, Kabul
London Times
August 21, 2009

At 8am, an hour after the Afghanistan's presidential polls opened, the polling station at the Haji Janat Gul High School, a dusty collection half-finished buildings designated for use by Kuchi nomads, was entirely empty of voters.

But the apparent lack of voter activity was deceptive, insisted election officials; the ballot boxes were already full almost to the brim. "The people have already come. They came here with lorries at 7 am, now they have gone to the fields with their sheep" said Lawan Geen proudly.

The grey bearded election worker from the Independent Election Commission seemed rather less than happy at the unannounced arrival of two Times journalists at his polling centre just outside Kabul.

The absence of voters witnessed by The Times yesterday in this centre on the edge of the capital was replicated across the country, with fearful Afghans staying away from the polls after repeated threats from the Taleban.

But the polling station in Pul-e-Charki painted a suspiciously different picture. In total 5,530 votes had already been cast for the Presidential Elections, according to the records being kept by the election staff beside each ballot box. In each box there were an oddly uniform 500 to 510 votes. More impressive still, some 3,025 of the ballots were womens votes.

Assuming that the last voter disappeared at least two minutes before the Times arrived at 7.55am, the staff working on the 12 separate ballot boxes at the site must have been processing at least 100 voters per minute since polling began.

There were no sign of any election monitors at the site and nor were there any female staff to oversee the women?s ballot boxes, as the electoral commission required.

For an hour The Times waited at the polling site. The polling staff fidgeted. But no one came to vote.

"This area is controlled by Haji Mullah Lewani Khan. He is the chief of the Tarokhail tribe and an MP" said Lawan Geen, the election official. "He said that there is a threat from the Taleban to cut the fingers off the people. So people came early in the morning" he added, hopping from one foot to the other, looking uncomfortable.

The tribal chief, he confided, was a supporter of President Karzai. “All the people here are Tarokhail, they are all voting for Karzai.” His co-workers were unhelpful. “You are not allowed to see these things, this is a woman?s area” said one male worker as The Times asked to see the lists of voter card numbers for ballots already cast.

Suddenly a lorry chugged into view. “Look there are voters!” shouted Lawan Geen, scampering towards the approaching vehicle. About thirty men were helped off the lorry, several were elderly and one was almost entirely blind. They trooped into the polling station and prepared to vote.

A burly middle-aged man called Lal Mohammad stepped forward and held out two voting cards. At the sight the election officials went into collective convulsion and shooed one back into his pocket.

After he had voted he explained that he had voted for President Karzai. Asked about the second voting card in his pocket he showed the contents of his several other pockets before finally pulling out the card. "It is my wife's," he said. "I will bring her later."

Other voters also said they were voting for Mr Karzai. "If Doctor Abdullah wins it will be a shame on all Pashtun people because he is a Tajik" said Haji Abdullah, a pistol-toting young man who looked about 16 but whose voter registration card put him at 21. He insisted that he was old enough to vote, pointing out that he had voted in 2004. “Maybe Afghanistan will be destroyed if he wins,” he added. “Certainly there will be fighting.”

As the thirty voters each made their way to the ballot box it became evident that the staff were able to process a maximum four voters every three minutes, or at best 80 voters per ballot box per hour, or 960 for the entire polling centre per hour. How was it possible then to process 5,530 in an hour, The Times wondered. Did the election officials suspect any sort of fraud?

Lawan Geen pursed his lips. "Maybe there has been a little bit by some people. Maybe 5 per cent," he ventured.

Outside the polling station five policemen stood guard. They had been at the station since the night before and explained what they had seen. “At about 4am the IEC staff came to the polling station,” said one policeman named Iqbal. “Since then we haven?t seen a lot of people. Maybe four lorries of people and three or four Corolla cars. I have not seen any women here.” The other policemen corroborated the tale.

A mile away The Times found the tribal chief Haji Mullah Lewani Khan MP in his grand, high-walled compound. Thirty metres from his front door was another polling station in the Haji Janat Gul Madrassa. Both were buildings originally built by Mr Lewani in memory of his father.

Outside the madrassa polling centre stood half a dozen armed men, supporters of Mr Lewani. One of them wore a badge with Mr Karzai?s face on it.

Mr Lewani, a diminutive 35-year-old with a regal air, welcomed The Times with a large group of retainers at his shoulder, several of whom wore the blue armbands, meant to mark them out as Independent Election Commission workers. All such workers are supposed to be vetted for their impartiality.

"They are helping the IEC just for today," said Haji Mullah casually. "They are not getting any wages." His two phones rang continuously. "We need more ballot papers," he shouted into one. "Call the election commission and tell them we need more." Asked if he had voted, the MP replied: “Of course, for Karzai.” Oddly none of his fingers displayed any of the indelible ink used to identify those who had voted. “I washed my hands,” he said.

What did he think of suggestions that vote rigging might be taking place locally, wondered The Times. “These claims of corruption are just shit, maybe they are publicity against us by Dr Abdullah supporters,” he said without blinking.

An hour after voting closed last night sources from the Independent Election Commission admitted that an investigation had begun into allegations that up to 70,000 illegal votes had been cast in polling centres around the Haji Janat Gul polling centre, east of Kabul.

Exclusive: Interview w/Taliban Leader

Inside the Taliban:
"The More Troops They Send, The More Targets We Have"
In the first of a series of exclusive reports in the run-up to next week's Afghan elections, award-winning correspondent Ghaith Abdul-Ahad meets a group of Taliban in their mountain stronghold

The Guardian (UK)
August 15, 2009

The provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika in south-eastern Afghanistan are dominated by one name: Jalaluddin Haqqani. A famous commander, tribal chief and cleric, Haqqani came to prominence during the war against the Soviets. In more than 20 years of fighting, he built an extensive network of influence that covered eastern Afghanistan and the tribal area of Waziristan in Pakistan, and reached as far abroad as the Gulf states, which he visited often.

Once a minister in the Taliban government, he is now aligned with their leader, Mullah Omar, but has retained independence and control over his men. His operations have struck deep into the territory controlled by Hamid Karzai's government, reaching targets in Kabul. The movement's signature attack is well co-ordinated and includes several suicide bombers, who storm into buildings before detonating their bombs.

We waited for Haqqani's Taliban in a roadside cafe not far from the Pakistani border, where old Russian trucks decorated with hundreds of little bells, painted waterfalls and eagles and religious slogans swayed under the weight of rice, sugar and flour they brought from Pakistan, and the illegally logged trees they carried in the other direction.

It was noon and we had a few hours to kill. Like everywhere in Afghanistan, there was road etiquette to respect. From nine in the morning until four in the afternoon, the government controls the country's main arteries. The rest of the time they belong to the Taliban.

The air in the cafe was filled with the potent smell of meat stew and damp feet. Bedding and cushions were piled at one end of the room, while at the other end men hastily finished their prayers, then sat cross-legged on the mottled carpets where two young boys set plates of rice and stew in front of them.

"Here, we are all of the same tribe," said a young Pashtun poet and journalist. He had a flimsy beard and eyes the colour of honey. "Ninety-five per cent of the people here support the Taliban. They give the Taliban shelter. The businessmen and traders give them money, and the five per cent who work for the government look the other way and wave you through if you are with Taliban. The tribes here are very strong. It would bring great shame on you to arrest your cousin.

"The situation is very simple here," he continued. "We are Muslims and tribal people, the Taliban are Muslim and from the same tribes, the foreign troops are non-Muslims and there was no referendum from the people to ask them to come here. God told us to fight the occupation so the people are against the occupation. The people are ideologically similar to the Taliban, so the Taliban don't hide, they live with the people."

A driver with a big bushy beard lay on his back, hugged an ageing tape player and listened with closed eyes to a melancholic Pashtun woman singing about love, longing and betrayal. His right foot drew circles in the air.

An hour later another song, loud and screechy, filled the room. A young boy chanted, drowning the driver's love songs. In front of the restaurant, in the middle of the road, an old pickup truck was parked and an old Talib with a big black turban and a chest-long beard stood next to it.

"March to your trenches, oh Taliban," the boy sang. "March to your trenches." The chant emanated from a loudspeaker on top of the car.

Several men walked over to the Talib and dropped money in his hands, donations to the Taliban. In the back of his truck three teenage Taliban sat on sacks of rice and flour donated by other villagers. The poet smiled. His point made, he went back inside to finish his tea.

The valley

Our ride arrived around five in the evening. We drove out of the village, down a steep slope, around the side of a hill and entered a valley where any pretence of government control vanished.

The only road here is a shallow river that twists between boulders and trees and is littered with rocks. We drove along it for two hours, against a muddy current that crashed down from the mountains above. Sheets of rain fell from the dark sky.

Past a bend in the river where the valley was so narrow that the trees formed a canopy over it, small terraced gardens protruded from the cliffs on each side, almost touching each other. "This is where we meet after our operations," said one of the Taliban in the car.

Villagers hopped on and off the back of the truck as we drove along, grabbing lifts, and the hum of the Taliban chants from a tape player broke through the sound of the rain and the waterfalls.

Leaving the riverbed, we drove uphill through a thick forest, past two scouts, who lay as motionless as the rocks around them, and stopped in a clearing in the wood guarded by two gunmen.

In the fading light I could make out here and there guns, hats, combat trousers, boots, a beard, another gun and a white flag. As we climbed the slope into the camp, the scattered objects became men, and by the time the stout commander with his cap pushed to the back of his head shook my hand, I could see a whole unit of more than 100 spread out on the wooded hilltop.

Instead of the trademark Taliban uniforms of turbans, eyeliner and flip-flops, these men wore Russian and Nato poncho raincoats over their shalwars, and boots and trainers. Most striking was the way they held their guns. Instead of carrying them in the standard militia style, on their shoulders or holding them like walking sticks, they wore them strapped around their chests, one hand by the trigger and the other holding the muzzle down. They stood just like the Americans.

The stout commander, Mawlawi Jalali, sat surrounded by his men. One carried the white flag of the Taliban and another a video camera, which he kept pointed at me at all times.

"We are Afghans fighting the jihad and defending our country under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani," the commander said. He spoke in a schoolmasterly tone. As well as being a commander, Mawlawi Jalali is a teacher in Haqqani's madrasa.

"The Americans toppled the emirate [of the Taliban] and we are fighting to bring it back. When the Taliban were here the jihad was only in Afghanistan. Now, thanks to the Americans, the jihad has spread to many other countries."

How did he plan to pursue his holy war? "We use different tactics: mining the streets, fighting and direct attacks. Here in this camp we make all the preparations and have all the men we need for these different tactics."

What about the new American surge, I asked. Did it concern him?

"We attack the towns, like in Wazi Zadran, where there is a strong American and Afghan garrison, and mine the streets every day. We average two or three attacks a day against the Americans and their allies. The more troops they send, the more targets we have, so it's good."

Allahu akbar, the men around him murmured in response.

He went on to explain the difference between his men and the average Taliban.

"We follow Haqqani. He was a smart mujahid against the Soviets and during all his wars he taught us how to focus on training and teaching. I was taught by him and most of our men were trained by him and his commanders. We have order, because we had good teaching and good training."

By this time, night had begun to fall, dogs barked and the men melted into the darkness. Only a flicker of light from a mobile phone separated the ghosts around me from the mountain behind them.

"We have mujahideen from the time of the emirate, but we have new fighters too," Mawlawi Jalali told me. "The young are keen to join, but we tell them stay put, finish your madrasa now and then come. We can't provide for all of them now and we can't get them supplies. The government and the Americans control the streets and the cities because of the planes, but the mountains are for us."

The number of men stationed on this single mountain cliff might explain how the Haqqani Taliban have managed recently to launch bold and relatively large attacks.

The hum of a generator rose and fell in the background, sometimes drowning our conversation. I looked for signs of electricity, but apart from a few flickering oil lamps in a faraway village, there was nothing but darkness for kilometres on each side of the valley. I realised suddenly what a "generator hum" meant on a mountain in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"Drone … plane … sky …" I mumbled my words, closed my eyes and waited for the whoosh of a missile.

The commander and his men laughed. "These are media lies, that Americans can see us," he said. "Look now, we are a big group of Taliban. There are 200 men here and they can't see us. We believe in God, so don't be scared."

Another fighter spoke up: "If you stand still in the dark and not move they can't see you. It's written in the Qu'ran."

On the way to the camp I had been told of other drone-dodging techniques. If you are on a motorcycle and the drone fires a missile, jump off and the missile will follow the motorcycle. If you are with a large group, stop, like musical statues, and the drone will confuse you with the trees.

A young fighter called for prayer and the commander and half his men lined up to pray, their guns on the ground in front of them. When they had finished, the other half began to pray.

"We are Afghans, we have lived all our lives in the trenches and caves," said the commander as he shook my hand. "We tell the Americans to stop this war, we are not tired." His fatigued voice, however, told a different story.

The village

The men separated into three groups. Two headed to different villages, while the third climbed up the cliff to take up fighting positions. We followed one group down to a small village.

After half an hour we were among houses, and the men dispersed. We waited outside a green door while a Talib went in to talk to the owners. In a valley where everyone comes from the same tribe and everyone is someone's cousin, finding a shelter for the night is simply a matter of knocking on a door.

The family gave us their largest room and six of us took their places, on cushions and mattresses that were still warm. A kerosene lamp was lit and we shared a dinner of eggs, tomato, yoghurt and dry, dark bread.

"You are not the first Iraqi here," said one of the fighters. He was tall and thin and poor-looking, with a big beard and clothes that were a faded grey. "There is an Iraqi commander who is fighting in the mountains. He has been here for many years and he is very good." He scooped up bits of eggs and tomatoes with a piece of bread.

Like everyone else, the tall fighter was a graduate of madrasas. Unlike other Taliban, Haqqani's men do not divide their time between farming or working and fighting. "When we don't fight, we take religious classes with the emir [commander]," explained the tall fighter. He was a specialist in ambushes, he said, and explained his tactics. Because of the threat from planes, the fighters didn't move around in big groups any more: they travelled to the attack areas in twos and threes.

He positioned a glass and a piece of bread and a cucumber in a triangle. The glass represented the target.

"We hit them [the glass] with a mine and we position ourselves here [bread and cucumber] and shoot. Then when the attack is over we move towards the woods before the helicopters arrive."

After dinner the men wrapped themselves in their blankets and scarves and slept. We left the house soon after morning prayers as a thick mist that had settled in the bottom of the valley was chased away by the early morning sun, which filtered down the mountains through the cypresses.

Men squatted in the fields, relieving themselves. We walked in the muddy lanes. Women with heads wrapped loosely in colourful scarves walked in small groups carrying buckets of water. A young girl with wild hair and wide eyes followed us at a distance.

At the entrance to the village, local men sat on the edge of the river wrapped in their scarves and blankets and looked intently at everything that moved: the three trucks piled high with logged trees, the other villagers, and the Taliban and their guests.

We met Mawlawi Jalali again in a different field. A few of his men walked between the high grass and trees, patrolling the valley.

"The villagers are good," he said. "They feed us and give us shelter, even if we are 100 men, but sometimes their hearts are weak – they think that the foreigners bring development projects to help them, which is not true. This is why we have to forcefully stop these projects, to protect the villagers."

What about schools, and education for the villagers? "We have no problem with education, it's the curriculums that we have problems with. Under our [Taliban] government, when we taught the children the letter J it stood for jihad. Now it's jar [meaning neighbour]. So we closed the schools, but we have madrasas for the children."

As we drove out of the valley the Taliban pickup truck again gave lifts to villagers. Old women, young men and couples held on to the sides of the car as it climbed over the rocks and drove through the water.

On a mountain road outside the valley, a group of contractors and their heavily-armed security escorts were clearing the road of debris. It was the wreckage of one of their cars, an SUV that had been blown in half earlier in the week. Bits of blackened flesh lay on the road and a piece of blue cloth hung from a bush.

We drove on, down from the high mountains of eastern Afghanistan towards Kabul.

Fingers, the Taliban, and Sex

Taliban Threat To Chop Off Fingers Of Afghan Voters

By Ben Farmer
London Daily Telegraph
August 15, 2009

TALIBAN commanders have threatened to chop off the fingers of anyone caught voting in next week?s presidential elections. Insurgents in southern Afghanistan said fingers found bearing the indelible ink used to mark voters would be removed.

“We will know those who cast a vote from the ink, and his finger will be cut off,” a commander warned villagers in the south of the country.

The Taliban ruling council, led by Mullah Omar, has called on Afghans to boycott the election, described them as an American sham and told its fighters to block roads to polling stations.

President Hamid Karzai?s heartland is in the rural Pashtun south, where kinsmen could deliver crucial votes for his re-election campaign. But the risk of violent retribution from the Taliban and the prospect of re-electing a president who has attracted intense criticism for his policies in the final weeks of campaigning could dissuade many from turning out.

Mr Karzai faces a second round run-off because he is now unlikely to win by the 50 per cent of votes required.

As the presidential campaign entered its final week yesterday, human rights advocates accused Mr Karzai of betraying Afghanistan's women for votes after it was disclosed that he had ratified a controversial law said to condone marital rape.

The president's recent decision to free five convicted drug traffickers, including the nephew of his campaign manager, was also questioned by a minister in charge of hunting down Afghan opium lords.

Mr Karzai addressed thousands of supporters in the north-east city of Herat as it emerged that controversial legislation governing family life for the country?s Shia minority had been rushed through to become law.

The president was forced to reform the original draft in the face of international outcry earlier this year when it was found to rule that a woman had to satisfy her husband's sexual desires at least every fourth night.

But the amended version, which has quietly come into force after being published in the country?s official gazette, still maintains that a husband can stop feeding his wife if she does not submit to him.

Brad Adams, Asia director of the New York-based Human Rights Watch, said: “Karzai has made an unthinkable deal to sell Afghan women out in return for the support of fundamentalists.”

The law also grants custody of children only to fathers and grandfathers.

McChrystal: Cut Staff & Replace with Infantry

General Considers More Afghanistan Fighters:
may swap support forces for combat troops
By Rowan Scarborough
Washington Times
August 14, 2009

The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan is examining whether some support personnel could be replaced by combat forces as a way to increase America's war fighting capacity without requesting a major addition of new troops.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is facing conflicting pressures as he prepares a major strategy review to be delivered to the White House in the coming weeks. A group of outside advisers has recommended that he request as many as 21,000 more troops, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Thursday that the general would not seek additional troops at this time.

There are currently 62,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with 6,000 more expected to arrive by the end of the year. Mr. Gates said at a Pentagon briefing: "We need some time to see what the impact of all that is" before additional troop increases are considered.

He said that Gen. McChrystal is free to ask for whatever resources he feels he needs, but Mr. Gates doesn't expect a request on troop strength in the coming report.

A military source involved in Afghanistan planning told The Washington Times that Gen. McChrystal is exploring as much as a 12% cut in certain manpower slots, a move that would all ow him to request more combatants without substantially increasing the overall troop commitment. The source spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the discussions.

Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell confirmed Thursday that Gen. McChrystal was examining support staff levels.

"Among the things Secretary Gates asked General McChrystal to look at [in his strategy review] was the staff he was inheriting to make sure all his personnel were being used to maximum effect. If we had the means of getting people from behind desks and out into the field, we should take a close look at that," Mr. Morrell told The Times.

Lt. Col. Edward Sholtis, Gen. McChrystal's spokesman, said in an e-mail to The Times that there had been "a direction to identify where such cuts could be made, rather than a decision or direction to actually reduce the force."

"Resource requirements across the theater currently are being analyzed here, but there have been no final decisions or recommendations on numbers of personnel or other resourcing issues."

However, there is a widespread feeling among military specialists that more combat troops are needed to successfully carry through the broader counterinsurgency mission unveiled in March.
Last week, in an interview with editors and reporters of The Times, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he favored the initial Afghanistan surge that began in February.

"We needed to get troops in order to have an impact, particularly this year, because the Taliban's getting tougher, better organized, more sophisticated, better tactics, better intelligence, all those kinds of things. If we delayed that, we would miss a significant period of time to engage them."

A former defense official close to the strategic assessment team of outside specialists told The Times that those advisers are recommending four to six new combat brigades, or up to ! 21,000 troops.

The advisers included such think-tank heavyweight s as Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, who helped President George W. Bush devise the "surge" strategy for Iraq; and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Also in the group are Fred Kagan, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who also helped develop the Iraq surge strategy, and Andrew Exum, a former U.S. Army Ranger who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is a scholar at the Center for a New American Security.

Mr. Morrell said Thursday that there is a big difference between the advice of outside specialists and the recommendations of the commanding general in Afghanistan.

"While their participation I am sure is greatly appreciated by Gen. McChrystal and his team, there is a clear distinction between dispensing advice and the commanding general taking that advice. And given that Gen. McChrystal is still very much in the throes of this assessment, no one, especially these outside advisers, is! in a position to know what he is thinking or is about to decide.

It is simply premature to draw conclusions about what he will present to the defense secretary."

Reached by e-mail Thursday, Mr. Exum wrote, "Any and all recommendations on resources were pending a thorough troop-to-task analysis, which was to take place after we departed Kabul.

"But the assessment was commissioned by the NATO secretary-general and the U.S. secretary of Defense. And if they do not want the commander's recommendation on resources to be included in the report, that is certainly their prerogative."

Mr. Biddle declined to comment to The Times. But in an in-house interview at the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Biddle let it be known that he favors more troops, just as he did for Iraq.

"I certainly continue to think that either course of action - staying or withdrawing - has important problems," he said. "On balance, staying is the better course, but only if we're p! repared to resource it correctly. The weakest argument is staying and under-resourcing it. That creates the opportunity to lose slowly, which is the worst of the three possible approaches."

He added: "One of the central issues for near-term strategy in Afghanistan is, even if the administration substantially increases the number of troops they want in this theater, it's going to be awhile before they can build up to those counts. So for a while to come, we're going to be stuck with too few troops to provide security everywhere."

After returning from Afghanistan, Mr. Cordesman said at a July 29 press conference that the path to victory would require more U.S. brigades, a doubling in the strength of the Afghan army, and reforms to the government.

"We, the United States, are going to have to provide the resources if we want to win," Mr. Cordesman said. "Most of the incremental resources will have to come from us. This means very substantial budget increases, it means more brigade combat troops and it means financing both the civ! ilian effort needed in the field and a near doubling of Afghan national security forces."

The source involved in Afghan planning said he understood that Gen. McChrystal was leaning toward asking his commander, Gen. David H. Petraeus, and Mr. Gates for more combat troops. This source said Gen. McChrystal's staff is now conducting a "troop-to-task" analysis to see if the reinforcements are necessary.

After the outside specialists briefed Gen. McChrystal, he made an unannounced trip Aug. 2 to Brussels to confer with Mr. Gates.

A new troop request, on top of the 21,000 additional troops already approved by Mr. Obama, could touch off a battle between the Army and the White House. Army headquarters at the Pentagon is working to increase rest time for soldiers beyond one year before they redeploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. Having to come up with thousands of more troops would disrupt those plans.

Prior to his remarks Thursday, Mr. Gates appeared to be preparin! g for a new Afghan escalation. He announced in late July that he think s the ongoing Iraq troop withdrawal can be accelerated. He also announced a temporary increase of 22,000 men and women in the active Army.

"I expect the Army to be able to find the new people," said Baker Spring, a defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation. "In my mind, the more serious problem is how the Department of Defense is going to pay for the increase in overall personnel levels and a still-high operational tempo with a topline budget for defense in 2011 that is roughly $70 billion less than in 2010."

The administration's five-year budget plan shows overall defense spending dropping from $692.7 billion in 2010 to $620.5 billion in 2011. It is banking on reduced war costs in Iraq to achieve the reduction.

The White House is cool toward any further Afghan escalation.

Mr. Cordesman rebuked the administration for making dismissive remarks about a troop increase before it sees Gen. McChrystal's report. National Security Adviser James L. Jones said! on Sunday's talk shows that it is too soon to consider such increases.

"Quite frankly, it would probably be just as well if people in the National Security Council and the White House made their judgments after they get the assessment they need rather than try to resource constrain an assessment in a way that can lose the war," he said.

Eli Lake contributed to this report.

Sen Graham: Don't 'Rumsfeld Afghanistan'

Graham: Don't 'Rumsfeld Afghanistan'

Senator Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.)is transforming a former Defense Secretary's name into a derogatory verb and warning that the U.S. needs to deploy the resources needed to keep Afghanistan stable.

"Let's not Rumsfeld Afghanistan. Let’s don’t do this thing on the cheap. Lets have enough combat power and engagement across the board to make sure we’re successful," Graham told CBS's "Face the Nation."

The senator explained that he was alluding to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's support for invading Iraq with a minimal number of U.S. troops.

Graham said he was nearly certain that the Pentagon will ask for more troops to be sent to Afghanistan.

"I will be shocked if more troops are not requested by our commanders," Graham said on CBS. "We must secure more troops….I will shocked if more troops are not needed."

The Afghan Elections - Amb Karl Eikenberry

In Afghanistan, A Time To Debate And Decide
By Karl W. Eikenberry
Washington Post
August 3, 2009

In the run-up to Afghanistan's presidential and provincial council elections on Aug. 20, Afghan and international political elites and journalists will pass judgment on the past five years. But only the Afghan people can decide who will best lead their country for the next five.

Afghanistan's elections present an opportunity for the country's citizens to create a future of prosperity and peace for their children. Five years ago, with guid! ance from the international community, Afghanistan held its first elections and began the process of building a new state -- a complex and difficult effort following 25 years of invasion, civil war, oppression and foreign-inspired terrorism. This time, Afghan authorities bear the full responsibility for fulfilling their people's right to choose their leaders, with the international community assisting, not leading. But none of this will matter unless the voters have a real choice and know what each candidate stands for. There must be a serious debate among the candidates and by the Afghan people.

The issues at stake are numerous and weighty. How will the next president finish building a strong army and police force respected by the people and fully capable of providing security? Can the nation's wealth be used for investment and development in an accountable manner? How will young people be educated and trained to develop the human capital that Afghanistan needs to mo! ve forward? What policies will be adopted to encourage the return to A fghan society of those who renounce ties with international terrorism and the use of force while accepting the constitution of the nation? What are the candidates' ideas for governing Afghanistan; how, for example, should the provincial councils evolve to give a real voice to Afghans across the land? And how can the international community better partner with Afghanistan to achieve peace, justice and economic progress?

In March, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy that includes a major commitment of American men and women -- civilian and military -- to Afghanistan, as well as important new financial contributions to help accelerate development. We will continue to work with the next Afghan administration to field capable and sufficient Afghan National Army and police units; to support effective government personnel systems; to help combat corruption; to provide financial assistance to key Afghan institutions; to promote agricultural development; to address de! tention issues; to support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts; and to fix contracting practices. All of these efforts must be underpinned by accountability on both sides. The international community looks forward to strengthening its partnership with whichever candidate emerges from the elections, based upon a renewed spirit of cooperation.

So it is not just the Afghan people who need to understand the candidates' platforms and plans. We members of the international community need to know these things, too. The United States is one nation among a great partnership of more than 40 NATO and non-NATO countries that have joined with the people and government of Afghanistan. We have lost our sons and daughters, just as Afghans have, and we have invested significant development assistance during difficult economic times. Our commitment is extraordinary and long term. We are prepared to forge ahead based on common interests and mutual obligations. We stand with absolute impar! tiality regarding who should be president of Afghanistan. But all of u s will benefit from clarity as to what policy goals we should expect from the next administration.

This is an exciting time to be in Afghanistan. Walking through the bazaars of Helmand, Wardak, Kunduz, Herat, Uruzgan, Khost and numerous other provinces where the Afghan people are defending against destabilizing forces, I have seen their hope and thirst for progress. Candidates -- some prominent, some relatively new to the national stage -- are for the most part embracing their responsibility to discuss the issues. Ongoing televised debates remind me that, though we may be separated by barriers of language and culture, the democratic process in Afghanistan is like our own: an intense competition of political ideas to the benefit of the common citizen.

On Aug. 20, Afghan men and women will travel great distances -- in some cases, unfortunately, under threat of attack -- to make their voices heard. In the final weeks of this election season, the Afghan people deserv! e to know the platforms and implementation plans of each candidate. And so do we. The stakes are high and the opportunity great for all of us. The Afghan people and international community must be positioned to move quickly in partnership immediately after the inauguration of Afghanistan's next president. We have no time to lose as we work together to deliver peace, justice, economic opportunity and regional understanding.

It is time for a serious debate.

The writer is the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. He has served five years in the country in civilian and military capacities, including as commander of international forces from 2005 to 2007.

Press Release from Camp Leatherneck

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 19, 2009
PRESS RELEASE 09-07
CAMP LEATHERNECK, Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan –

Afghan National Army soldiers and U.S. Marines from Regimental Combat Team 3, Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, conducted a raid on a known insurgent stronghold July 18 in the town of Lakari, Garmsir District.

The raid force uncovered several weapons caches – including supplies used in making improvised explosive devices – and a stockpile of Afghan National Army uniforms, used by insurgents in ambush attacks. The force also included members of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit supported by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and discovered a significant quantity of illegal drugs, which help fund the insurgents.

There were no reports of ANA or civilian casualties, or damage to civilian property.

Tom Friedman & Afghanistan

Teacher, Can We Leave Now? No.
By Thomas L. Friedman
New York Times
July 19, 2009

Pushghar, Afghanistan--I confess, I find it hard to come to Afghanistan and not ask: Why are we here? Who cares about the Taliban? Al Qaeda is gone. And if its leaders come back, well, that’s why God created cruise missiles.

But every time I start writing that column, something stills my hand. This week it was something very powerful. I watched Greg Mortenson, the famed author of “Three Cups of Tea,” open one of his schools for girls in this remote Afghan village in the Hindu Kush mountains. I must say, after witnessing the delight in the faces of those little Afghan girls crowded three to a desk waiting to learn, I found it very hard to write, “Let’s just get out of here.”

Indeed, Mortenson’s efforts remind us what the essence of the “war on terrorism” is about. It’s about the war of ideas within Islam — a war between religious zealots who glorify martyrdom and want to keep Islam untouched by modernity and isolated from other faiths, with its women disempowered, and those who want to embrace modernity, open Islam to new ideas and empower Muslim women as much as men. America’s invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were, in part, an effort to create the space for the Muslim progressives to fight and win so that the real engine of change, something that takes nine months and 21 years to produce — a new generation — can be educated and raised differently.

Which is why it was no accident that Adm. Mike Mullen, the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — spent half a day in order to reach Mortenson’s newest school and cut the ribbon. Getting there was fun. Our Chinook helicopter threaded its way between mountain peaks, from Kabul up through the Panjshir Valley, before landing in a cloud of dust at the village of Pushghar. Imagine if someone put a new, one-story school on the moon, and you’ll appreciate the rocky desolateness of this landscape.

But there, out front, was Mortenson, dressed in traditional Afghan garb. He was surrounded by bearded village elders and scores of young Afghan boys and girls, who were agog at the helicopter, and not quite believing that America’s “warrior chief” — as Admiral Mullen’s title was loosely translated into Urdu — was coming to open the new school.

While the admiral passed out notebooks, Mortenson told me why he has devoted his life to building 131 secular schools for girls in Pakistan and another 48 in Afghanistan: “The money is money well spent. These are secular schools that will bring a new generation of kids that will have a broader view of the world. We focus on areas where there is no education. Religious extremism flourishes in areas of isolation and conflict.

“When a girl gets educated here and then becomes a mother, she will be much less likely to let her son become a militant or insurgent,” he added. “And she will have fewer children. When a girl learns how to read and write, one of the first things she does is teach her own mother. The girls will bring home meat and veggies, wrapped in newspapers, and the mother will ask the girl to read the newspaper to her and the mothers will learn about politics and about women who are exploited.”

It is no accident, Mortenson noted, that since 2007, the Taliban and its allies have bombed, burned or shut down more than 640 schools in Afghanistan and 350 schools in Pakistan, of which about 80 percent are schools for girls. This valley, controlled by Tajik fighters, is secure, but down south in Helmand Province, where the worst fighting is today, the deputy minister of education said that Taliban extremists have shut 75 of the 228 schools in the last year. This is the real war of ideas. The Taliban want public mosques, not public schools. The Muslim militants recruit among the illiterate and impoverished in society, so the more of them the better, said Mortenson.

This new school teaches grades one through six. I asked some girls through an interpreter what they wanted to be when they grow up: “Teacher,” shouted one. “Doctor,” shouted another. Living here, those are the only two educated role models these girls encounter. Where were they going to school before Mortenson’s Central Asia Institute and the U.S. State Department joined with the village elders to get this secular public school built? “The mosque,” the girls said.

Mortenson said he was originally critical of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he’s changed his views: “The U.S. military has gone through a huge learning curve. They really get it. It’s all about building relationships from the ground up, listening more and serving the people of Afghanistan.”

So there you have it. In grand strategic terms, I still don’t know if this Afghan war makes sense anymore. I was dubious before I arrived, and I still am. But when you see two little Afghan girls crouched on the front steps of their new school, clutching tightly with both arms the notebooks handed to them by a U.S. admiral — as if they were their first dolls — it’s hard to say: “Let’s just walk away.” Not yet.

Pakistani Problems Threatening Afghanistan

Extremists In Pakistan Putting US Afghan Strategy In Jeopardy
By Robert Burns, Associated Press
Arizona Daily Star (Tucson)

WASHINGTON — A central pillar of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan — enlisting Pakistan to eliminate extremist havens on its side of the border — is being tested so severely it calls into question the viability of the entire plan.

When President Obama announced on March 27 his approach to turning around the war in Afghanistan, he said stronger action by neighboring Pakistan against Taliban sanctuaries on its soil was "indispensable." He called the insurgent-infested border area "the most dangerous place in the world."

Since then, extremists have not only held their own on the border but have made inroads toward Pakistan's capital.

The extremists, including Pakistani elements of the Taliban, are not a homogenous force; some elements are focused more on infiltrating Afghanistan to contest control of that country, while others are oriented toward destabilizing Pakistan. But in either case the trends are growing more worrisome for an Obama administration that has decided the Afghan problem cannot be fixed without progress in Pakistan.

Reports of a pullback Friday from the militants' latest advances toward Islamabad were greeted with measured relief in Washington, but there remains a worry that the Pakistani government is failing to deal forcefully with Islamist fighters slowly advancing toward the heart of the nuclear-armed country.

Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said developments in Pakistan have caused "deep anxiety" among administration officials — "and a worry about the viability, frankly, of any Afghan strategy, not just this one."

There seem to be few other options for the U.S. in Pakistan. It has used periodic missile attacks from Predator drone aircraft to strike extremist leadership targets, but more direct military action would seem unlikely. Obama has pledged to provide more financial and other non-military support, while warning Islamabad that U.S. patience is limited.

Obama made the calculation that Pakistan's sovereignty must be respected and therefore U.S. ground forces would not be used inside Pakistan against the extremists, including elements of the al-Qaida network whose leaders are believed to be operating on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan.

He said Pakistan, with U.S. help, must show its commitment to making progress against the extremists.

Since Obama laid out that strategy, Pakistan arguably has regressed, endangering one pillar of the U.S. plan. The other pillars are a U.S. military and civilian buildup in Afghanistan and a redoubling of U.S. and allied efforts to train an Afghan security force capable of handling the insurgency on its own.

David W. Barno, a former top commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, says extremists threaten to upend the very existence of Pakistan.

"Events in Pakistan are spiraling out of control," Barno told Congress on Thursday, "and our options in reversing the downward acceleration are limited at best."

U.S. officials have sought, with limited success, to nudge the Pakistani government toward confronting the extremists. The frustration was evident in Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's assertion to Congress on Wednesday that the Pakistanis are "basically abdicating" to the extremists.

At least as cutting were comments Friday in Afghanistan by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I'm increasingly both concerned and frustrated at the progression of the danger," he said in an NBC News interview one day after meeting with Pakistani officials.

What it's like in Afghanistan

Western Troops' Finest Foe In Southern Afghanistan

Los Angeles Times
March 17, 20

It gets in their engines, their sleeping bags, even between their teeth. There is no escaping this gritty menace.

By Laura King

COMBAT POST BARROW, AFGHANISTAN -- Thousands of U.S. and other Western troops in the south of Afghanistan do battle daily with a foe far more ubiquitous than Taliban insurgents: dust.

Chalky and powdery, it fouls engines and electronic gear. It seeps through the seams of clothing and sleeping bags. It cakes dry lips, stains sweaty faces and coats the interiors of tents and armored vehicles.

Food and water take on a gritty tang. With the consistency of talc, the dust of southern Afghanistan is billowy when dry, slimy when wet, with a concrete-hard crust when it re-dries. Locals use it to build the durable mud-brick compounds that dot the desert, home to Afghan civilians and combatants alike.

Inert, the dust presents an infinite-seeming horizon, particularly eerie when viewed through night-vision goggles. Whipped by wind into funnel clouds that can reach hundreds of feet in the air, it is the bane of military aviators.

Choking clouds of it are kicked up whenever convoys roll past or helicopters land. At one remote U..S. Marine base, a visitor was cheerfully informed, "You'll be coughing up mud balls for a week!"

Dust played a well-documented role in ancient warfare, serving as a kind of antique early-warning system. Some generals used guile to make their approaching armies appear larger than they were, creating huge dust clouds with mules dragging bundles of branches.

In a modern-day setting, the vast, bare expanse of Afghan desert provides little cover for insurgents; even a small band of fighters can be readily sighted. But Western convoys, too, are visible for miles, with their signature halo of dust.

In rustic military outposts where indoor and outdoor living blur together, any piece of gear left unattended acquires a film of fine grit within moments. Undisturbed for a day or two, mundane objects like plastic-wrapped crates of drinking water come to resemble relics of a lost civilization.

Despite the primitive living conditions, military outposts are hives of high-tech equipment: surveillance cameras that sweep the surrounding desert, monitors relaying footage from unmanned aerial drones. All need constant cleaning or they will become dust-clogged -- "canned air saves us," said Marine Pfc. Conor Wood of Ronkonkoma, N.Y.

When a desert dust storm sweeps through, it can take with it almost anything that isn't tied down, and sometimes things that are. This month, Marines at a forward operating base in Farah province built an open-sided mess hall, but had only a few days to admire their handiwork before a sandstorm blew the roof off.

With dust as a daily companion, personal hygiene is a losing battle. Grit insinuates its way into crevices between teeth -- and among the bristles of toothbrushes used to scrub them. And woe betide any wearer of contact lenses.

There's no plumbing in the remotest outposts, only solar showers that deliver a chilly deluge few wish to brave. Many Marines go months without a shower, growing more dust-crusted by the day. They launder their own fatigues, one said, "when the pants are standing up, waiting for you to climb into them."

Springtime is the season of sandstorms, and in the open desert, they approach as a ghostly vision, turning the air yellowish, then greenish, then black.

"At 1500 hours [3 p.m.], it was like the middle of the night," said Navy medical corpsman Joshua Steinhilber of Webster, N.Y., describing a dirt-blasted tempest that recently swept through. "We figured it had to be either the Apocalypse or a dust storm bearing down," he said. "So a dust storm -- that was fine."

King was recently on assignment in Afghanistan..

Pakistan: Closer to the Abyss

Closer To The Cliff
New York Times
March 13, 2009
Editorial, P. 26

Pakistan's rival political leaders seem determined to push their already unstable country over a cliff. Their increasingly out-of-control power struggle spilled out of the halls of government and the courtroom this week and onto the streets. The more time and energy they waste on selfish squabbling, the less they have to combat extremists who pose a mortal threat to their country.

We are especially alarmed to see President Asif Ali Zardari repeating the excesses of his predecessor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Six months after taking office, Mr. Zardari?s government has banned Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister, and his brother from holding office. It issued a two-week halt on rallies and threatened to charge Mr. Sharif with sedition.

On Wednesday, authorities arrested hundreds of political activists. A day later, police in riot gear forcibly dispersed some of the thousands of Pakistanis marching from Karachi to Islamabad in support of an independent judiciary.

That?s the kind of repressive behavior that Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister, criticized Mr. Musharraf for before she was assassinated. Mr. Zardari is dishonoring his late wife?s memory by following that same path.

Mr. Sharif is all too eager to manipulate this destructive drama for personal gain. He has taken up the cause of anti-government lawyers who have long campaigned for the reinstatement of the country?s former top judge who was dismissed by Mr. Musharraf. But we fear his real goal is to topple Mr. Zardari, whose popularity has plummeted as Mr. Sharif?s has risen.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan until Pakistan defeats Taliban and Al Qaeda forces along the border.. And there can be no security in the region, if a nuclear-armed Pakistan is unraveling.

President Obama and his aides are still developing a policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are pleased to see that they moved quickly on Thursday to try to defuse the crisis. The American ambassador in Islamabad spoke with Mr. Sharif, and an envoy, Richard Holbrooke, had a video conference call with Mr. Zardari.

They need to press Mr. Zardari now to compromise on the dispute over Pakistan?s courts and to allow Mr. Sharif to run for office. And they need to press Mr. Sharif to work for peaceful political solutions. If there is any hope for democracy in Pakistan, a robust opposition must be allowed to flourish and participate fully in the country?s political life.

Mr. Obama must also ensure that any new aid to Pakistan strengthens democratic institutions, not just whoever is president.

Already, some Washington analysts are suggesting there might be worse things than a return to military rule in Pakistan. We?ve seen this movie before, and it is not a strategy for long-term stability.

Petraeus: Afghan-Pak problems are the same

Petraeus: Afghan, Pakistan problems are really one

By ANNE GEARAN, AP Military Writer


WASHINGTON – U.S. policy to win in Afghanistan must recognize the poor nation's limitations and its neighborhood, especially its intertwined relationship with U.S. terrorism-fighting ally Pakistan, the top U.S. military commander in the region said Thursday.

Army Gen. David Petraeus, who became a household name overseeing the war in Iraq, now oversees the older, smaller and less promising fight in Afghanistan as well. He predicted a long war in Afghanistan, without quantifying it.

Petraeus told a Washington audience that a winning strategy in Afghanistan will look different from the one in Iraq. He offered few specifics as the incoming Obama administration assess its options in the 7-year-old Afghanistan war that has gone much worse than anticipated, just as U.S. fortunes have improved in Iraq. He also suggested the United States and its partners may one day have common purpose with Iran, another Afghanistan neighbor, in stabilizing and remaking that country.

"There has been nothing easy about Afghanistan, indeed nearly every aspect has been hard and that will continue to be the case in 2009 and the years beyond," Petraeus said in an address to the United States Institute of Peace.

The address was part of a conference highlighting world trouble spots at the moment of political transition in the United States. The institute released a sober outline of problems in Afghanistan as part of the session.

The report said the U.S. and its partners have shortchanged Afghanistan by focusing on short-term goals pursued without a cohesive strategy or clear understanding of how the decentralized country works. It suggested President-elect Barack Obama should refocus the U.S. war and rebuilding effort in Afghanistan and think of the project as the work of at least a decade.

Petraeus' own review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is expected to be presented to Obama the week after he takes office Jan. 20. The plan would shift the focus from the waning fight in Iraq to the escalating Afghan battle.

President George W. Bush's in-house Iraq and Afghanistan adviser has already done a separate assessment; it has not been made public.

The U.S. is rushing 20,000 American troops into Afghanistan to combat a Taliban insurgency that has sent violence to record levels. U.S. officials have warned the violence will probably intensify in the coming year. More U.S. troops, 151, died in Afghanistan in 2008 than in any other year since the 2001 invasion to oust the Taliban.

A suicide bomber struck U.S. troops patrolling on foot in southern Afghanistan on Thursday, killing at least two soldiers and three civilians and wounding at least nine others, officials said.

Petraeus linked Afghanistan's fortunes directly to Pakistan's, where a U.S.-backed civilian government is struggling and the country's ability to control militants along its border with Afghanistan is in doubt.

"Afghanistan and Pakistan have, in many ways, merged into a single problem set, and the way forward in Afghanistan is incomplete without a strategy that includes and assists Pakistan," and also takes into account Pakistan's troubled relationship with rival India, Petraeus said.

On Iran, Petraeus said he would leave the details to diplomats. But he suggested that the longtime U.S. adversary could be part of a regional effort to right Afghanistan. Afghanistan's strategic location and recent history both as a cradle of terrorism and source of most of the world's heroin make it of interest to nations from the West to the Middle East and beyond.

"Iran is concerned about the narcotics trade — it doesn't want to see ... extremists running Afghanistan again any more than other folks do," Petraeus said.


Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.