Why We're Not Winning in Afghanistan

Afghanistan: The 'Good War' Gets Complicated
By David Wood
Afghanistan Journal (PoliticsDaily.com)
September 4, 2009


COMBAT OUTPOST ZORMAT, Afghanistan -- When a warning crackled over the radio of a suspected ambush ahead, Lt. Col. Rob Campbell swore softly and ordered his three armored trucks to a halt. What happened next illustrates why the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan is failing, why commanders here are asking for more manpower- and why they are pleading for more time.

Leaping out with his M-4 carbine, Campbell, a tall cavalry officer with sandy hair and freckles, strode through the empty, sun-baked fields flanking the road while his men fanned out, checking the ground for IEDs, sweeping the fields for snipers. The Afghan police assigned to patrol this stretch of road? Nowhere in sight.

"I can't be doing this all day," Campbell grumbled as he paused to examine a distant building through his rifle scope. Campbell is a senior officer. He commands a U.S. Army cavalry squadron of roughly 1,000 soldiers. Handling a suspected ambush is a job for a junior soldier with two or three years experience.

Carefully, they approached a tumbledown building beneath a dusty grove of wilted trees. Three disheveled young Afghans emerged, blinking in the sunlight: Afghan National Police. There was little sign of the U.S. training and equipment they'd received.

The ambush report was a false alarm, but for Campbell, it was a teachable moment.

"Who's in charge here? Where are your boots and helmets and uniforms?"Campbell demanded. "You have to look professional, then people will respect you and the Taliban will not attack!"

The young police managed to look both sheepish and skeptical. Through a translator, they complained that an overnight rain had left a foot of water in their sleeping quarters. When the Taliban mortars them at night, they have no mortar to shoot back.

"You have to go out and patrol," Campbell lectured them as they stood sullenly. "The Taliban will run away. That's how you stop them from attacking. You don't need a mortar." He climbed back in his multi-ton, air-conditioned armored truck. The police did not wave goodbye.

The plain fact in Afghanistan today is there are too few U.S. troops, and too few reliable Afghan security forces, to protect the population from the Taliban and other insurgents. But, in this complex war, simply pouring more American combat power into Afghanistan isn't enough, commanders here say.

"We need the support of the population; the insurgents only need to control the population -and they do that by making them scared to act." Col. Michael Howard told me. Hunting down and killing enemy insurgents is necessary, he and others argue, but it's not enough. Winning means enabling Afghans to resist the Taliban on their own- militarily, politically, socially and economically.

Howard is an intense, sinewy war-fighter who commands the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 25th Infantry Division, which is spread across three provinces (Paktika, Paktiya and Khowst) of eastern Afghanistan. This is his fourth deployment in Afghanistan, and he's seen enough to know that firepower alone is insufficient to win. This time, he wields an impressive array of combat troops, plus military and civilian experts working on economic and agricultural development, mentoring local government officials, and training and advising Afghan army and police. In his secret daily battle-update briefing, officials from the State Department, Agriculture Department, USAID and other civilian agencies sit at his side. "And they're in charge of things and make decisions and produce results" Howard stressed.

But for U.S. soldiers and Marines trained to seize and hold a hilltop or other objective, this is a complicated, ambiguous and seemingly endless campaign. Their biggest fear is than an impatient American public or Congress will reach the same conclusion, and not understanding the complexity and long-term nature of this war, will pull the plug on what looks like a losing quagmire.

"We are winning here, but the requirement to win faster is real because at some point, people will lose faith," said Howard, referring both to Afghans and the American public. "The war is really over-simplified to the American public, and that's a function of how it's reported," Howard scolded me.

But another officer, an artillery officer, struggling here with small-town tribal and political dynamics, confessed: "Even my family doesn't understand what we're trying to do here."

Small wonder, for the requirements of this war turn conventional military thinking on its head. The very presence of American troops in body armor, helmets and ballistic sunglasses can be intimidating, Afghans say. And American combat power and tactics, no matter how judiciously applied, often alienate local people. An insurgent killed by U.S. forces is likely to have a local family committed to revenge, no matter how they view the war. Kill an insurgent, create four new ones, as the saying here goes.

"I could do nothing but kill the enemy all day long, while public support goes down to nothing," said Campbell. His men are excruciatingly careful about wielding their power. In seven months, they haven't kicked down a door- formerly a common practice by troops conducting house searches.

But Campbell also told me of an operation one night when overhead surveillance showed what looked like a team of insurgents planting IEDs beside a road. He and his staff watched until they were certain, and then called in a strike -on local farmers engaged in midnight planting.

"It was horrible, something I'll have to live with," Campbell said with anguish on his angular face. He took a goat and compensation payment to the family of the dead farmer, and apologized. "They forgave us, so we didn't create any new insurgents," he assured me.

Still, deadly errors like that have set back the war effort during the seven years that American forces have been operating here in east-central Afghanistan, a region of broad plains and towering mountains. In March 2002, two battalions of infantry, from the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions, mounted an assault into the mountains above what is now Combat Outpost Zormat. The plan was to surround and kill fleeing remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Instead, the insurgents escaped into the jagged peaks and narrow defiles of the Shah-i-Khot Valley.

Having covered that operation first-hand, I was curious to see how seven years of U.S. military operations here, and costly training and equipping of the Afghan army and police -- $5.6 billion in Afghanistan this year alone -- had improved security.

Sadly, things have gotten worse.

In Gardez, the nearest city, a young Afghan told me the insurgents still hold the Shah-i-Khot, and U.S. commanders said they avoid that area, content for the moment to leave insurgents to themselves up in that relatively unpopulated area."We're focused on the population centers, which is not ideal," said Capt. Brian Johnson, the 27-year-old who commands the modest Zormat combat outpost. Insurgents travel through the area in groups of 10 or 20, he said, but a neighboring combat outpost that could intercept them is not manned "because of a lack of [U.S.] troops."
In the more populated valleys below, Johnson's men run joint patrols and targeted attacks with the Afghan army unit based next door. "There's more good news than bad news here,'' he insisted. A year ago, a trip up the road to another combat outpost required the brigade commander's permission and attack helicopters hovering overhead. "This morning, we went back and forth twice with no permission or escort needed," he said.

Still, U.S. and Afghan forces have been unable to effectively protect the civilian population across the region. Insurgents have set a record number of IEDs, about 45 percent more than a year ago. About half of those are detected or avoided before they detonate -- but Afghan civilian casualties have still risen sharply. Here in Paktiya Province, the number of civilians killed, mostly by insurgent IEDs, is up 29 percent from last year, while across the broader region of eastern Afghanistan the number of civilians killed and wounded rose about 45 percent.

Col. Howard, the brigade commander, told me the rising violence is a deep concern that has led him to raise the issue of getting additional U.S. troops, although he wouldn't say how many he needs.

"The violence has to come down to a level where it doesn't affect the daily lives of the people, to a point where people aren't afraid to take an active part in their government -- and right now we're not at that level,'' he said. In particular, he is struggling with IEDs and official corruption, the two scourges that Afghans complain about the most. Corruption, Howard said, "is a cancer without a cure in Afghanistan. If we don't come up with a cure, it will cause us to fail."

The IED problem is manageable, with more resources, he suggested. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons, who run a violently dangerous Taliban network in this region, have poured tens of thousands of dollars into attacking the civilian population. "Those IEDs cost a ton of money, those suicide vests, the suicide truck bombs, cost thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars' worth of explosives."

"If your enemy ups his resourcing by 10 percent and you don't -- and you're not already winning by 10 percent in the first place, you're gonna have a setback," Howard said, explaining his current situation. The result is an increasingly intimidated population unwilling to vote, for example, or even risk routine travel.

Doctors at the Afghan civilian hospital in Khowst used to regularly make the short drive to visit the U.S. military hospital at Forward Operating Base Salerno, Howard's sprawling headquarters. No longer.

"It's very dangerous to be known to be working with the Americans," said Lt. Col. Patricia Ten Haaf, the hospital commander. "Two years ago there was a lot of back-and-forth, but now I wouldn't send my only eye surgeon there, and their doctors won't come here for internships. And I regret that."

A middle-aged Afghan doctor also lamented the deterioration of security. "In 2002 to 2006, the security situation was better. It was easy for an American doctor to come to Khowst hospital. Walking around the city was no problem. Now..." he crinkled his eyes in an apologetic smile. "Not possible." He asked not to be identified by name.

U.S. agricultural experts hired four Afghans from Khowst to be agricultural advisers. Their families received threatening "night letters" from the Taliban, and two of the four advisers quit. With the safety of the Afghan people eroding, Howard acknowledged that "we have to have an increase in resources -- certainly an increase in ground troops."

U.S., Allied and Afghan forces are winning every fight with insurgents. "But are we winning fast enough, are we bringing the violence down fast enough? I don't think we are," he acknowledged.

That concern is widespread among American military officers here. "You can't be here and not want to help the Afghan people, and I do think Afghanistan could again become a breeding ground for international terrorism,'' said Col. Cindra Chastain, deputy commander of the Indiana National Guard's agricultural development team in Khowst Province.

"Is the public willing to have us stay long enough to do what we need to do? I don't think so,'' she told me. "But if not, everything we're doing here will be wasted."

Afghan Election Antics or Comedy Central??

U.S. Walks Fine Line In Afghan Vote

By Anand Gopal and Matthew Rosenberg
Wall Street Journal
August 31, 2009

The U.S. and its allies are walking a thin line by trying to monitor the count in Afghanistan's presidential vote without influencing the outcome, as results from the election trickle into public view.

Rampant allegations of electoral fraud, combative statements from candidates, and po! pular speculation about the U.S.'s role as kingmaker have made the balancing act more difficult.

According to the latest results, released Saturday, President Hamid Karzai's lead has widened, with votes from a third of the polling stations counted. At stake in the vote is not just the credibility of the new Afghan government, but also that of the U.S. and its allies, who have backed the democratic experiment with troops on the ground, say Western diplomats.

"If Afghans don't believe in these elections, then the international community will have failed here," said a European diplomat in Kabul.

Meetings between Western officials and Afghan presidential candidates have fed talk of efforts to shape a runoff between the two lead candidates, President Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah. In this context, an Aug. 21 meeting between Mr. Karzai and U.S. regional envoy Richard Holbrooke has also assumed importance, if only to highlight the prominent American role in the el! ection.

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has said its only preference i s for a fair election. "We do not support or oppose any particular candidate, and whether there is a runoff is an issue for the Afghan electoral bodies to determine," the embassy said.

Saturday's results show Mr. Karzai has 46.2%, up three percentage points from earlier in the week and well ahead of the 31.4% obtained by Dr. Abdullah, a former foreign minister and the lead challenger -- but still short of the absolute majority needed to avoid a runoff.

The two million votes already counted represent one-third of Afghanistan's polling stations. The electoral commission said it will provide the next update Monday.

Fraud allegations have marred the election. Afghan and international observers say supporters of both candidates stuffed ballot boxes and intimidated voters. Critics of Mr. Karzai say his camp engaged in more widespread fraud, if only because there were fewer monitors in parts of the country where his support is strongest, and the Taliban insurgency! is at its most potent. The Karzai campaign denies engaging in any fraud.

The independent Electoral Complaints Commission had received more than 2,000 allegations of misconduct through Saturday. Nearly 700 were considered serious enough to affect the outcome, the commission said.

Dr. Abdullah has repeatedly said he will dispute the results only through legal means. At the same time, he has said Mr. Karzai can win only through "big fraud," and has presented photos and videos of alleged ballot-stuffing in favor of Mr. Karzai.

Over the weekend, Dr. Abdullah offered a bleak outlook for the country if people don't accept the election results. "If the democratic process does not survive, then Afghanistan doesn't survive," he told hundreds of supporters at a rally north of Kabul Friday.

Such talk, along with private suggestions from some in Dr. Abdullah's camp that a Karzai win could be met with violent protests, has prompted U.S. and European officials to ! press the doctor to rein in his people. Dr. Abdullah's comments are "s omething that certainly worries all of us. It's not at all helpful at this moment," said a U.S. diplomat in Kabul.

As the vote count becomes more contentious, the U.S. and its allies are finding it harder to play a hands-off role. Over the weekend, U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown called Dr. Abdullah to discuss the elections, according to Abdullah campaign spokesman Fazel Sangcharaki.

"The British were very concerned about the possibility of violence," said Mr. Sangcharaki. "But they were careful not to suggest anything to us except for asking us to respect the legal process."

The U.K. Embassy in Kabul didn't respond to requests to comment.

A meeting the day after the Aug. 20 vote between Mr. Karzai and Mr. Holbrooke, who was accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry and another senior American official, illustrated the delicacy of the U.S. role. U.S. and Afghan officials with knowledge of the meeting described it as tense but not especi! ally heated. The Americans raised concerns about electoral fraud. They avoided pointing fingers at the president, but urged Mr. Karzai's government to address endemic corruption, if he were indeed re-elected, according to people with knowledge of the meeting. Mr. Karzai and Mr. Holbrooke met again Sunday to discuss many of the same issues, these officials said.

But the exchange quickly became part of Afghanistan's political folklore, spun by some into a shouting match in which Mr. Karzai stormed out of the room -- a scenario both U.S. and Afghan officials deny. Supporters of Mr. Karzai painted it as a U.S. attempt to force the rightful winner into a runoff. Opponents sought to portray it as another sign that the president, who came to power with the backing of the Bush administration, has lost Washington's backing and could no longer effectively govern.

Finally - Marines Do Right by Chessani

Marine Escapes Charges In 24 Killings In Iraq

Los Angeles Times
August 29, 2009

CAMP PENDLETON--The Marine Corps has decided not to seek to reinstate criminal charges against a former battalion commander for a 2005 incident in which his troops killed 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq.

Instead, the Marine Corps will convene a Board of Inquiry to hear testimony and recommend whether Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani should be demoted to major for purposes of retirement.

Even if such a recommendation is made and then accepted by the Secretary of the Navy, Chessani's retirement pay would still be based on being a lieutenant colonel.

The Marine Corps had sought to try Chessani for dereliction of duty for not ordering a war-crimes investigation when his Marines killed the 24, including three women and seven children. Chessani, who was not present during the killings, reported to his superiors that the deaths, while tragic, were the result of fighting between Marines and insurgents.

A court-martial judge threw out the charges after ruling that it was improper for a Marine lawyer who investigated the Haditha shootings to sit in on meetings with the general who decided to bring the charges.

--Tony Perry

Gen Jones: Our Goals in Aghanistan

We Have Clarity In Our Goals
Administration takes fight to the extremists, denies them havens.By Gen James Jones, USMC, Ret.
White House National Security Adviser
USA Today
August 20, 2009

Today's election serves as another reminder that the future of Afghanistan lies in the hands of Afghans, and that significant challenges remain. President Obama's recently announced strategy is focused on protecting America's and our allies' security interests, while advancing a successful transition to Afghans' responsibility for their country.

First, there should be no doubt about the clear U.S. goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the collaboration of both countries, al-Qaeda and the extremists who attacked us on 9/11 are feeling relentless pressure. But should the Taliban be successful in its goal to take over Afghanistan again, there is no question that we and our allies would again be unacceptably threatened. That is why the president is focused on taking a comprehensive fight to the terrorists, and denying them the safe havens they seek. Al-Qaeda and its allies will not be successful if recent trends in executing our strategy continue.

To achieve our goals, the president has put in place a comprehensive strategy supported by the international community. We have increased troop strength in Afghanistan, while increasing support to the Pakistani government in going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the border. In just a few months, we have put the Taliban on the defensive in places where it used to act with impunity, and many of its top commanders are now forced to wonder whether each day will be their last. Our increased military capacity has joined with NATO allies in accelerating the training of the Afghan army and police, so that they can take over responsibility for security at an accelerated pace.

We and our allies have also stepped up civilian support. By advancing the economy, encouraging individual opportunity and strengthening governance from the smallest village to Kabul, we isolate extremists, put a dent in a drug trade that funds insurgents and help establish security. To succeed, these pillars — security, the economy and governance — must advance in unison. We are joined in this effort by 47 countries and institutions such as NATO, the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank. This will sustain a shared, international commitment to Afghanistan's future.

I served in command of NATO's efforts in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2006, and have studied this war as a private citizen. This is the first time in seven years that we have had clarity in our goals, and a strategy and resources necessary to get the job done. We won't solve every problem; we are pursuing the possible, not the perfect. But this is not simply an "American war" — it is an international effort to rid the region of the ravages of extremism to protect ourselves and our allies, while giving the Afghan people the opportunity to control their future.

The president has been clear that this won't be easy, but it is necessary. It will take great sacrifice — especially by our men and women in uniform, our dedicated civilians who work alongside them at great risk, and their families who suffer long separations. But we are pointed in the right direction, we are protecting our people, and we are doing what is necessary to achieve our goals and bring our troops home as soon as possible.

Exclusive: Interview w/Taliban Leader

Inside the Taliban:
"The More Troops They Send, The More Targets We Have"
In the first of a series of exclusive reports in the run-up to next week's Afghan elections, award-winning correspondent Ghaith Abdul-Ahad meets a group of Taliban in their mountain stronghold

The Guardian (UK)
August 15, 2009

The provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika in south-eastern Afghanistan are dominated by one name: Jalaluddin Haqqani. A famous commander, tribal chief and cleric, Haqqani came to prominence during the war against the Soviets. In more than 20 years of fighting, he built an extensive network of influence that covered eastern Afghanistan and the tribal area of Waziristan in Pakistan, and reached as far abroad as the Gulf states, which he visited often.

Once a minister in the Taliban government, he is now aligned with their leader, Mullah Omar, but has retained independence and control over his men. His operations have struck deep into the territory controlled by Hamid Karzai's government, reaching targets in Kabul. The movement's signature attack is well co-ordinated and includes several suicide bombers, who storm into buildings before detonating their bombs.

We waited for Haqqani's Taliban in a roadside cafe not far from the Pakistani border, where old Russian trucks decorated with hundreds of little bells, painted waterfalls and eagles and religious slogans swayed under the weight of rice, sugar and flour they brought from Pakistan, and the illegally logged trees they carried in the other direction.

It was noon and we had a few hours to kill. Like everywhere in Afghanistan, there was road etiquette to respect. From nine in the morning until four in the afternoon, the government controls the country's main arteries. The rest of the time they belong to the Taliban.

The air in the cafe was filled with the potent smell of meat stew and damp feet. Bedding and cushions were piled at one end of the room, while at the other end men hastily finished their prayers, then sat cross-legged on the mottled carpets where two young boys set plates of rice and stew in front of them.

"Here, we are all of the same tribe," said a young Pashtun poet and journalist. He had a flimsy beard and eyes the colour of honey. "Ninety-five per cent of the people here support the Taliban. They give the Taliban shelter. The businessmen and traders give them money, and the five per cent who work for the government look the other way and wave you through if you are with Taliban. The tribes here are very strong. It would bring great shame on you to arrest your cousin.

"The situation is very simple here," he continued. "We are Muslims and tribal people, the Taliban are Muslim and from the same tribes, the foreign troops are non-Muslims and there was no referendum from the people to ask them to come here. God told us to fight the occupation so the people are against the occupation. The people are ideologically similar to the Taliban, so the Taliban don't hide, they live with the people."

A driver with a big bushy beard lay on his back, hugged an ageing tape player and listened with closed eyes to a melancholic Pashtun woman singing about love, longing and betrayal. His right foot drew circles in the air.

An hour later another song, loud and screechy, filled the room. A young boy chanted, drowning the driver's love songs. In front of the restaurant, in the middle of the road, an old pickup truck was parked and an old Talib with a big black turban and a chest-long beard stood next to it.

"March to your trenches, oh Taliban," the boy sang. "March to your trenches." The chant emanated from a loudspeaker on top of the car.

Several men walked over to the Talib and dropped money in his hands, donations to the Taliban. In the back of his truck three teenage Taliban sat on sacks of rice and flour donated by other villagers. The poet smiled. His point made, he went back inside to finish his tea.

The valley

Our ride arrived around five in the evening. We drove out of the village, down a steep slope, around the side of a hill and entered a valley where any pretence of government control vanished.

The only road here is a shallow river that twists between boulders and trees and is littered with rocks. We drove along it for two hours, against a muddy current that crashed down from the mountains above. Sheets of rain fell from the dark sky.

Past a bend in the river where the valley was so narrow that the trees formed a canopy over it, small terraced gardens protruded from the cliffs on each side, almost touching each other. "This is where we meet after our operations," said one of the Taliban in the car.

Villagers hopped on and off the back of the truck as we drove along, grabbing lifts, and the hum of the Taliban chants from a tape player broke through the sound of the rain and the waterfalls.

Leaving the riverbed, we drove uphill through a thick forest, past two scouts, who lay as motionless as the rocks around them, and stopped in a clearing in the wood guarded by two gunmen.

In the fading light I could make out here and there guns, hats, combat trousers, boots, a beard, another gun and a white flag. As we climbed the slope into the camp, the scattered objects became men, and by the time the stout commander with his cap pushed to the back of his head shook my hand, I could see a whole unit of more than 100 spread out on the wooded hilltop.

Instead of the trademark Taliban uniforms of turbans, eyeliner and flip-flops, these men wore Russian and Nato poncho raincoats over their shalwars, and boots and trainers. Most striking was the way they held their guns. Instead of carrying them in the standard militia style, on their shoulders or holding them like walking sticks, they wore them strapped around their chests, one hand by the trigger and the other holding the muzzle down. They stood just like the Americans.

The stout commander, Mawlawi Jalali, sat surrounded by his men. One carried the white flag of the Taliban and another a video camera, which he kept pointed at me at all times.

"We are Afghans fighting the jihad and defending our country under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani," the commander said. He spoke in a schoolmasterly tone. As well as being a commander, Mawlawi Jalali is a teacher in Haqqani's madrasa.

"The Americans toppled the emirate [of the Taliban] and we are fighting to bring it back. When the Taliban were here the jihad was only in Afghanistan. Now, thanks to the Americans, the jihad has spread to many other countries."

How did he plan to pursue his holy war? "We use different tactics: mining the streets, fighting and direct attacks. Here in this camp we make all the preparations and have all the men we need for these different tactics."

What about the new American surge, I asked. Did it concern him?

"We attack the towns, like in Wazi Zadran, where there is a strong American and Afghan garrison, and mine the streets every day. We average two or three attacks a day against the Americans and their allies. The more troops they send, the more targets we have, so it's good."

Allahu akbar, the men around him murmured in response.

He went on to explain the difference between his men and the average Taliban.

"We follow Haqqani. He was a smart mujahid against the Soviets and during all his wars he taught us how to focus on training and teaching. I was taught by him and most of our men were trained by him and his commanders. We have order, because we had good teaching and good training."

By this time, night had begun to fall, dogs barked and the men melted into the darkness. Only a flicker of light from a mobile phone separated the ghosts around me from the mountain behind them.

"We have mujahideen from the time of the emirate, but we have new fighters too," Mawlawi Jalali told me. "The young are keen to join, but we tell them stay put, finish your madrasa now and then come. We can't provide for all of them now and we can't get them supplies. The government and the Americans control the streets and the cities because of the planes, but the mountains are for us."

The number of men stationed on this single mountain cliff might explain how the Haqqani Taliban have managed recently to launch bold and relatively large attacks.

The hum of a generator rose and fell in the background, sometimes drowning our conversation. I looked for signs of electricity, but apart from a few flickering oil lamps in a faraway village, there was nothing but darkness for kilometres on each side of the valley. I realised suddenly what a "generator hum" meant on a mountain in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"Drone … plane … sky …" I mumbled my words, closed my eyes and waited for the whoosh of a missile.

The commander and his men laughed. "These are media lies, that Americans can see us," he said. "Look now, we are a big group of Taliban. There are 200 men here and they can't see us. We believe in God, so don't be scared."

Another fighter spoke up: "If you stand still in the dark and not move they can't see you. It's written in the Qu'ran."

On the way to the camp I had been told of other drone-dodging techniques. If you are on a motorcycle and the drone fires a missile, jump off and the missile will follow the motorcycle. If you are with a large group, stop, like musical statues, and the drone will confuse you with the trees.

A young fighter called for prayer and the commander and half his men lined up to pray, their guns on the ground in front of them. When they had finished, the other half began to pray.

"We are Afghans, we have lived all our lives in the trenches and caves," said the commander as he shook my hand. "We tell the Americans to stop this war, we are not tired." His fatigued voice, however, told a different story.

The village

The men separated into three groups. Two headed to different villages, while the third climbed up the cliff to take up fighting positions. We followed one group down to a small village.

After half an hour we were among houses, and the men dispersed. We waited outside a green door while a Talib went in to talk to the owners. In a valley where everyone comes from the same tribe and everyone is someone's cousin, finding a shelter for the night is simply a matter of knocking on a door.

The family gave us their largest room and six of us took their places, on cushions and mattresses that were still warm. A kerosene lamp was lit and we shared a dinner of eggs, tomato, yoghurt and dry, dark bread.

"You are not the first Iraqi here," said one of the fighters. He was tall and thin and poor-looking, with a big beard and clothes that were a faded grey. "There is an Iraqi commander who is fighting in the mountains. He has been here for many years and he is very good." He scooped up bits of eggs and tomatoes with a piece of bread.

Like everyone else, the tall fighter was a graduate of madrasas. Unlike other Taliban, Haqqani's men do not divide their time between farming or working and fighting. "When we don't fight, we take religious classes with the emir [commander]," explained the tall fighter. He was a specialist in ambushes, he said, and explained his tactics. Because of the threat from planes, the fighters didn't move around in big groups any more: they travelled to the attack areas in twos and threes.

He positioned a glass and a piece of bread and a cucumber in a triangle. The glass represented the target.

"We hit them [the glass] with a mine and we position ourselves here [bread and cucumber] and shoot. Then when the attack is over we move towards the woods before the helicopters arrive."

After dinner the men wrapped themselves in their blankets and scarves and slept. We left the house soon after morning prayers as a thick mist that had settled in the bottom of the valley was chased away by the early morning sun, which filtered down the mountains through the cypresses.

Men squatted in the fields, relieving themselves. We walked in the muddy lanes. Women with heads wrapped loosely in colourful scarves walked in small groups carrying buckets of water. A young girl with wild hair and wide eyes followed us at a distance.

At the entrance to the village, local men sat on the edge of the river wrapped in their scarves and blankets and looked intently at everything that moved: the three trucks piled high with logged trees, the other villagers, and the Taliban and their guests.

We met Mawlawi Jalali again in a different field. A few of his men walked between the high grass and trees, patrolling the valley.

"The villagers are good," he said. "They feed us and give us shelter, even if we are 100 men, but sometimes their hearts are weak – they think that the foreigners bring development projects to help them, which is not true. This is why we have to forcefully stop these projects, to protect the villagers."

What about schools, and education for the villagers? "We have no problem with education, it's the curriculums that we have problems with. Under our [Taliban] government, when we taught the children the letter J it stood for jihad. Now it's jar [meaning neighbour]. So we closed the schools, but we have madrasas for the children."

As we drove out of the valley the Taliban pickup truck again gave lifts to villagers. Old women, young men and couples held on to the sides of the car as it climbed over the rocks and drove through the water.

On a mountain road outside the valley, a group of contractors and their heavily-armed security escorts were clearing the road of debris. It was the wreckage of one of their cars, an SUV that had been blown in half earlier in the week. Bits of blackened flesh lay on the road and a piece of blue cloth hung from a bush.

We drove on, down from the high mountains of eastern Afghanistan towards Kabul.

Fingers, the Taliban, and Sex

Taliban Threat To Chop Off Fingers Of Afghan Voters

By Ben Farmer
London Daily Telegraph
August 15, 2009

TALIBAN commanders have threatened to chop off the fingers of anyone caught voting in next week?s presidential elections. Insurgents in southern Afghanistan said fingers found bearing the indelible ink used to mark voters would be removed.

“We will know those who cast a vote from the ink, and his finger will be cut off,” a commander warned villagers in the south of the country.

The Taliban ruling council, led by Mullah Omar, has called on Afghans to boycott the election, described them as an American sham and told its fighters to block roads to polling stations.

President Hamid Karzai?s heartland is in the rural Pashtun south, where kinsmen could deliver crucial votes for his re-election campaign. But the risk of violent retribution from the Taliban and the prospect of re-electing a president who has attracted intense criticism for his policies in the final weeks of campaigning could dissuade many from turning out.

Mr Karzai faces a second round run-off because he is now unlikely to win by the 50 per cent of votes required.

As the presidential campaign entered its final week yesterday, human rights advocates accused Mr Karzai of betraying Afghanistan's women for votes after it was disclosed that he had ratified a controversial law said to condone marital rape.

The president's recent decision to free five convicted drug traffickers, including the nephew of his campaign manager, was also questioned by a minister in charge of hunting down Afghan opium lords.

Mr Karzai addressed thousands of supporters in the north-east city of Herat as it emerged that controversial legislation governing family life for the country?s Shia minority had been rushed through to become law.

The president was forced to reform the original draft in the face of international outcry earlier this year when it was found to rule that a woman had to satisfy her husband's sexual desires at least every fourth night.

But the amended version, which has quietly come into force after being published in the country?s official gazette, still maintains that a husband can stop feeding his wife if she does not submit to him.

Brad Adams, Asia director of the New York-based Human Rights Watch, said: “Karzai has made an unthinkable deal to sell Afghan women out in return for the support of fundamentalists.”

The law also grants custody of children only to fathers and grandfathers.

McChrystal: Cut Staff & Replace with Infantry

General Considers More Afghanistan Fighters:
may swap support forces for combat troops
By Rowan Scarborough
Washington Times
August 14, 2009

The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan is examining whether some support personnel could be replaced by combat forces as a way to increase America's war fighting capacity without requesting a major addition of new troops.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is facing conflicting pressures as he prepares a major strategy review to be delivered to the White House in the coming weeks. A group of outside advisers has recommended that he request as many as 21,000 more troops, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Thursday that the general would not seek additional troops at this time.

There are currently 62,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with 6,000 more expected to arrive by the end of the year. Mr. Gates said at a Pentagon briefing: "We need some time to see what the impact of all that is" before additional troop increases are considered.

He said that Gen. McChrystal is free to ask for whatever resources he feels he needs, but Mr. Gates doesn't expect a request on troop strength in the coming report.

A military source involved in Afghanistan planning told The Washington Times that Gen. McChrystal is exploring as much as a 12% cut in certain manpower slots, a move that would all ow him to request more combatants without substantially increasing the overall troop commitment. The source spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the discussions.

Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell confirmed Thursday that Gen. McChrystal was examining support staff levels.

"Among the things Secretary Gates asked General McChrystal to look at [in his strategy review] was the staff he was inheriting to make sure all his personnel were being used to maximum effect. If we had the means of getting people from behind desks and out into the field, we should take a close look at that," Mr. Morrell told The Times.

Lt. Col. Edward Sholtis, Gen. McChrystal's spokesman, said in an e-mail to The Times that there had been "a direction to identify where such cuts could be made, rather than a decision or direction to actually reduce the force."

"Resource requirements across the theater currently are being analyzed here, but there have been no final decisions or recommendations on numbers of personnel or other resourcing issues."

However, there is a widespread feeling among military specialists that more combat troops are needed to successfully carry through the broader counterinsurgency mission unveiled in March.
Last week, in an interview with editors and reporters of The Times, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he favored the initial Afghanistan surge that began in February.

"We needed to get troops in order to have an impact, particularly this year, because the Taliban's getting tougher, better organized, more sophisticated, better tactics, better intelligence, all those kinds of things. If we delayed that, we would miss a significant period of time to engage them."

A former defense official close to the strategic assessment team of outside specialists told The Times that those advisers are recommending four to six new combat brigades, or up to ! 21,000 troops.

The advisers included such think-tank heavyweight s as Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, who helped President George W. Bush devise the "surge" strategy for Iraq; and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Also in the group are Fred Kagan, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who also helped develop the Iraq surge strategy, and Andrew Exum, a former U.S. Army Ranger who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is a scholar at the Center for a New American Security.

Mr. Morrell said Thursday that there is a big difference between the advice of outside specialists and the recommendations of the commanding general in Afghanistan.

"While their participation I am sure is greatly appreciated by Gen. McChrystal and his team, there is a clear distinction between dispensing advice and the commanding general taking that advice. And given that Gen. McChrystal is still very much in the throes of this assessment, no one, especially these outside advisers, is! in a position to know what he is thinking or is about to decide.

It is simply premature to draw conclusions about what he will present to the defense secretary."

Reached by e-mail Thursday, Mr. Exum wrote, "Any and all recommendations on resources were pending a thorough troop-to-task analysis, which was to take place after we departed Kabul.

"But the assessment was commissioned by the NATO secretary-general and the U.S. secretary of Defense. And if they do not want the commander's recommendation on resources to be included in the report, that is certainly their prerogative."

Mr. Biddle declined to comment to The Times. But in an in-house interview at the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Biddle let it be known that he favors more troops, just as he did for Iraq.

"I certainly continue to think that either course of action - staying or withdrawing - has important problems," he said. "On balance, staying is the better course, but only if we're p! repared to resource it correctly. The weakest argument is staying and under-resourcing it. That creates the opportunity to lose slowly, which is the worst of the three possible approaches."

He added: "One of the central issues for near-term strategy in Afghanistan is, even if the administration substantially increases the number of troops they want in this theater, it's going to be awhile before they can build up to those counts. So for a while to come, we're going to be stuck with too few troops to provide security everywhere."

After returning from Afghanistan, Mr. Cordesman said at a July 29 press conference that the path to victory would require more U.S. brigades, a doubling in the strength of the Afghan army, and reforms to the government.

"We, the United States, are going to have to provide the resources if we want to win," Mr. Cordesman said. "Most of the incremental resources will have to come from us. This means very substantial budget increases, it means more brigade combat troops and it means financing both the civ! ilian effort needed in the field and a near doubling of Afghan national security forces."

The source involved in Afghan planning said he understood that Gen. McChrystal was leaning toward asking his commander, Gen. David H. Petraeus, and Mr. Gates for more combat troops. This source said Gen. McChrystal's staff is now conducting a "troop-to-task" analysis to see if the reinforcements are necessary.

After the outside specialists briefed Gen. McChrystal, he made an unannounced trip Aug. 2 to Brussels to confer with Mr. Gates.

A new troop request, on top of the 21,000 additional troops already approved by Mr. Obama, could touch off a battle between the Army and the White House. Army headquarters at the Pentagon is working to increase rest time for soldiers beyond one year before they redeploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. Having to come up with thousands of more troops would disrupt those plans.

Prior to his remarks Thursday, Mr. Gates appeared to be preparin! g for a new Afghan escalation. He announced in late July that he think s the ongoing Iraq troop withdrawal can be accelerated. He also announced a temporary increase of 22,000 men and women in the active Army.

"I expect the Army to be able to find the new people," said Baker Spring, a defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation. "In my mind, the more serious problem is how the Department of Defense is going to pay for the increase in overall personnel levels and a still-high operational tempo with a topline budget for defense in 2011 that is roughly $70 billion less than in 2010."

The administration's five-year budget plan shows overall defense spending dropping from $692.7 billion in 2010 to $620.5 billion in 2011. It is banking on reduced war costs in Iraq to achieve the reduction.

The White House is cool toward any further Afghan escalation.

Mr. Cordesman rebuked the administration for making dismissive remarks about a troop increase before it sees Gen. McChrystal's report. National Security Adviser James L. Jones said! on Sunday's talk shows that it is too soon to consider such increases.

"Quite frankly, it would probably be just as well if people in the National Security Council and the White House made their judgments after they get the assessment they need rather than try to resource constrain an assessment in a way that can lose the war," he said.

Eli Lake contributed to this report.

Brits in Afghanistan

British Troops Have Poor Hygiene And Too Many Injuries, US Commander Says

By Michael Evans, Defence Editor
London Times
August 13, 2009

A US commander has criticised British troops in Helmand province, attacking everything from their gathering of intelligence to their personal hygiene.

The unnamed Marine commander claimed that British Forces spent insufficient time living among the Afghan people, were not posted for long enough, had too many bases and suffered too many non-battle injuries.

The confidential briefing, given in the spring, according to the New Statesman, also suggested that the British military “are cautious about the enemy and overestimate their strength”. The commander was quoted as saying: “Your standards of personal hygiene and field discipline aren?t good enough.”

Many soldiers in Helmand serve in primitive forward bases where facilities can be crude. Showers often consist of a plastic bag of water with a tap, hung from a frame. Soldiers returning from patrols in scorching heat have to wait their turn to get a shower.

The Ministry of Defence said that troops were aware that good personal “field hygiene” was important. It was “nonsense” that British hygiene was worse than American standards.

An army spokesman said: “We do not recognise this criticism of our highly professional troops. In the harsh battlefield conditions of Afghanistan every soldier knows that good field hygiene keeps them fighting fit.

“Recent US and UK operations in Helmand show that we work well together and US commanders rate the British Army very highly.”

The MoD also dismissed claims that British soldiers were suffering excessive non-battle injuries. “We have the same number of injuries whether the troops are serving in Afghanistan or back at home,” one official said.

Replying to the criticism that the tour lengths were too short, General Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the Army, said: “I?m completely convinced that at the level of intensity of fighting in Afghanistan at the moment, six months is as long as I want to commit our people to. It is very intense, it is very difficult.”

Benchmarks for Afghanistan??

Benchmarks Eyed For Afghanistan

U.S. seeks to test effectiveness of surge as skepticism grows
By Anne Gearan, Associated Press

The Obama administration is preparing a set of about 50 benchmarks for Afghanistan, senior officials said Monday, redefining how to measure success in a war now widely assessed as a stalemate.

The be! nchmarks will test how well the U.S. military and civilian "surges" ordered by President Obama are working. They cover Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The new measures, ordered by Congress, are due Sept. 24 amid creeping skepticism among many Democrats about the war's prognosis and costs.

"The deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan is conspicuous," the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote in a report to be released this week. The report notes a record number of U.S. soldiers and Marines died in Afghanistan last month.

"The coming months will test the administration's deepening involvement, its new strategy on counternarcotics specifically and its counterinsurgency effort in general," the senators wrote. "Some observers fear that the moment for reversing the tide in Afghanistan has passed and even a narrow victory will remain out of reach, despite the larger American footprint."

The Afghanistan benchmarks will be more detailed than the I! raq war scorecard used by the George W. Bush administration, a senior administration official said Monday. The White House is circulating a classified version among key lawmakers, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the unreleased document.

The old Iraq yardsticks had an all-or-nothing quality - either the Iraqi government passed a law governing oil resources or it didn't. Many of those tests remain unmet, even as the war there has subsided and U.S. forces prepare to leave.

In writing the Afghan version, Obama advisers say they want to look more broadly, measuring not only what gets done but how well and on what schedule. The benchmarks will include short- and long-term goals. Some will probably be flagged by color - red for things going poorly, green for those going well, the official said.

The reports will be submitted quarterly, with three or four due ahead of the unofficial deadline for measurable progress - 12 to 18 months - outlined by Mr. Obama and his top defense advisers this summer! .

Separately, the newly installed top U.S. general in Afghanistan is preparing an interim assessment that is expected to be a sober accounting of the difficulties of fighting an entrenched and technically capable insurgency eight years into the war.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is expected to identify shortfalls that should be filled by more forces - perhaps a mix of Afghan, NATO and U.S. Any recommendations for more U.S. forces would come through Gen. McChrystal's boss, Gen. David H. Petraeus.

Estimates of the additions Gen. McChrystal might recommend range from a few thousand to more than 20,000. Gen. McChrystal's predecessor had already asked for an additional 10,000 for next year, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and other top officials made it known they are skeptical.

"We believe that with the strategy and the assets and the infusion of resources, that we're going to be able to achieve our goals," White House spokesman Bill Burton said Monday.

There are 62,000 U.S. troops and 39,000 allied forces in Afghani stan, on top of about 175,000 Afghan soldiers and police. Some NATO countries plan to withdraw their troops in the next few years, even as the United States expands its presence.

Sen Graham: Don't 'Rumsfeld Afghanistan'

Graham: Don't 'Rumsfeld Afghanistan'

Senator Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.)is transforming a former Defense Secretary's name into a derogatory verb and warning that the U.S. needs to deploy the resources needed to keep Afghanistan stable.

"Let's not Rumsfeld Afghanistan. Let’s don’t do this thing on the cheap. Lets have enough combat power and engagement across the board to make sure we’re successful," Graham told CBS's "Face the Nation."

The senator explained that he was alluding to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's support for invading Iraq with a minimal number of U.S. troops.

Graham said he was nearly certain that the Pentagon will ask for more troops to be sent to Afghanistan.

"I will be shocked if more troops are not requested by our commanders," Graham said on CBS. "We must secure more troops….I will shocked if more troops are not needed."

Afghanistan: How To Define Victory?

White House Struggles To Gauge Afghan Success

By David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker
New York Times
August 7, 2009


WASHINGTON — As the American military comes to full strength in the Afghan buildup, the Obama administration is struggling to come up with a long-promised plan to measure whether the war is being won.

Those “metrics” of success, demanded by Congress and eagerly awaited by the military, are seen as crucial if the president is to convince Capitol Hill and the country that his revamped strategy is working. Without concrete signs of progress, Mr. Obama may lack the political stock — especially among Democrats and his liberal base — to make the case for continuing the military effort or enlarging the American presence.

That problem will become particularly acute if American commanders in Afghanistan seek even more troops for a mission that many of Mr. Obama’s most ardent supporters say remains ill defined and open-ended.

Senior administration officials said that the president’s national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, approved a classified policy document on July 17 setting out nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration’s policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Another month or two is still needed to flesh out the details, according to officials engaged in the work.

General Jones and other top National Security Council aides, including Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, gave an update to top Congressional leaders over recent days.

But as the Bush administration learned the hard way in Iraq, poorly devised measurements can become misleading indicators — and can create a false sense of progress.

That is especially difficult in a war like the one in Afghanistan, in which eliminating corruption, promoting a working democracy and providing effective aid are as critical as scoring military success against insurgents and terrorists.

For instance, some of the measures now being devised by the Obama administration track the size, strength and self-reliance of the Afghan National Army, which the United States has been struggling to train for seven years. They include the number of operations in which Afghan soldiers are in the lead, or the number of Afghan soldiers who have received basic instruction.

White House officials say they are taking the time to get the measurements right.

In some cases, old measurements are being thrown out. Commanders in Afghanistan say they no longer pay much attention to how many enemy fighters are killed in action. Instead, they are trying to count instances in which local citizens cooperate with Afghan and allied forces.

And in drafting a metric important to senior members of Congress, the administration is considering conducting an opinion poll to determine Afghan public perception of official corruption at national, provincial and district levels. This would give insight into how Afghan citizens view police performance at the neighborhood level all the way up to the quality of national political appointments.

But as the architects of similar metrics in Iraq learned, even the best-constructed measures can miss the larger truth.

In 2005 and 2006, for example, the White House was often citing the “rat rate” in Iraq, a measure of good tips from Iraqis about the location of insurgents or the planting of roadside bombs.

“We thought this was a good measure of how well the public was turning against” Al Qaeda and other insurgents, said Peter D. Feaver, a professor at Duke University who served in the National Security Council at the time. “What we discovered was that the rat rate numbers steadily improved over the course of 2006 — and the violence was rising.”

That experience helps to explain why the Obama administration has taken so much time. But some frustrated lawmakers said the delay might prove costly.

“We have been in Afghanistan now for more than seven and a half years,” said Representative Ike Skelton, a Democrat of Missouri and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. “These metrics are required to help make the case for the American people that actual progress is being made, or if we need to change the course to another direction. I think that time is not on our side.”

When President Obama unveiled his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March, he emphasized the importance of these measures.

“We will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable,” Mr. Obama said. “We’ll consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan security forces and our progress in combating insurgents. We will measure the growth of Afghanistan’s economy and its illicit narcotics production. And we will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.”

All that now seems unlikely to be completed before his field commanders finish their proposals for carrying out their marching orders. Their recommendations were originally due at the Pentagon within the next two weeks, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates issued expanded instructions for the assessment to the commanders last weekend and gave them until September to complete their report.

Skeptical lawmakers have implored Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Mr. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to produce what Mr. Obama promised, and they have made specific recommendations of their own.

“The metrics are critically important to keep everyone’s feet to the fire on this and for the public to know how we’re doing and have some ways to measure it and not have just rhetoric,” said Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We all share the president’s goal of succeeding in Afghanistan,” said Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. “The challenge here is how we are going to define success in the medium term, given the difficult security environment we face.”

Senior White House officials say their objectives are grouped in three main categories: counterterrorism, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The counterinsurgency objectives are highly classified and cover a “full range” of efforts to help Pakistan combat the militant threat in its tribal areas.

Others address Pakistan’s ability to maintain and strengthen democratically elected civilian government; the country’s ability to confront and defeat an internal insurgent threat; and international support for Pakistan, including international donors, the United Nations and the World Bank.

In Afghanistan, they would assess suppression of the insurgency; building and strengthening Afghan security forces; shoring up support for the government and reviving the economy; and garnering support from NATO, the European Union, the United Nations and international donors.

Pentagon: Afghan Review Delayed

Pentagon Says Review Of Afghan War To Be Delayed

By Pauline Jelinek, Associated Press
August 5, 2009

WASHINGTON -- Defense Secretary Robert Gates, asking that "a few other ideas" be taken into account, has extended the deadline for an assessment of how to turn around the war in Afghanistan, an official said Wednesday.

The report had been expected next week and now may come in late August or early September, Defense Department spokesman Geoff Morrell said.

Officials said last week that a draft of ! the assessment called for changes in the way troops operate and that after the report was finished commanders were likely to ask for more U.S. forces.

Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, flew Saturday to a U.S. air base in Chievres, Belgium, and met Sunday with the commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and several advisers.

"He was very impressed with the briefing he got and the assessment thus far," Morrell said of Gates. "But he wants (McChrystal) to take into consideration a few other ideas he had to address some additional issues in this review of the situation on the ground."

Gates told McChrystal to take beyond the 60 days first planned for the review, Morrell said.

Morrell told a Pentagon news conference that he didn't know what the additional ideas were.

The draft called for speeding up the training of Afghan soldiers and police and nearly doubling their numbers to ! roughly 400,000, officials said. Though more foreign trainers would be needed for that, it was unclear whether they would come from the U.S. or allied militaries.

The main recommendations in the draft for change were said to stem from the military's new counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which is now designed to focus less on going after Taliban strongholds and more on protecting the local population - something that affects where troops live and how and where they will fight.

More Troops to Afghanistan?

Optimistic Words On Afghanistan

The State Dept was upbeat. More cautious were defense officials. Top brass met Sunday.

By Anne Gearan, Associated Press
August 4, 2009

WASHINGTON -- A day after President Obama's senior defense advisers huddled in Europe to discuss the future of the war in Afghanistan, the State Department yesterday talked optimistically about the conflict that top generals have called a stalemate.

"We believe that this is a struggle that we are now, you know...we have turned a tide," State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said. "We're seeing success in Afghanistan, difficult as it is."

Hours later, five rockets slammed into the Afghan capital, Kabul, one of them near the U.S. Embassy, injuring at least one child, police said. "There's no indication these rockets targeted the U.S. Embassy," an embassy spokeswoman said. She requested anonymity because she was not authorized to release the information.

Crowley's remark came in response to a question about al-Qaeda, the terror network whose shelter in Afghanistan prompted the 2001 U.S.-led invasion. Crowley said later he was "not trying to minimize the complexity" of eventual success in Afghanistan.

Defense and military officials have been circumspect about the situation in Afghanistan in recent months, with some of them characterizing the conflict as stalemated.

Even after adding 21,000 troops to expand its war against Taliban insurgents, top defense and military officials are hashing over whether to ask the White House for even more forces in Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, flew Saturday to a U.S. air base in Chievres, Belgium, and met Sunday with several advisers including Gen. David Petraeus, who has overall responsibility for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Gates and Mullen were given an interim report on security in Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal is putting together an assessment of the war that may include a request for additional U.S. forces and resources.

The trip was organized in secret, and Gates traveled without his usual throng of staff and reporters.

McChrystal's study is expected to recommend a significant expansion of the Afghan armed forces and a reorganization of U.S. and NATO operations. Any request to expand U.S. forces would be on top of the 21,000 increase Obama approved earlier this year.

That brings the total to 68,000 scheduled to be in the country by the end of 2009 - about double the figure at the same time last year.

With 74 foreign troops killed - including 43 Americans - July was the deadliest month for international forces since the start of the war in 2001.

The civilian death toll also climbed yesterday as a Taliban bomb tore through a crowded street in western Afghanistan's main city, Herat, killing 11 people, hurting dozens, and critically wounding the district police chief it targeted, officials said.

The Afghan Elections - Amb Karl Eikenberry

In Afghanistan, A Time To Debate And Decide
By Karl W. Eikenberry
Washington Post
August 3, 2009

In the run-up to Afghanistan's presidential and provincial council elections on Aug. 20, Afghan and international political elites and journalists will pass judgment on the past five years. But only the Afghan people can decide who will best lead their country for the next five.

Afghanistan's elections present an opportunity for the country's citizens to create a future of prosperity and peace for their children. Five years ago, with guid! ance from the international community, Afghanistan held its first elections and began the process of building a new state -- a complex and difficult effort following 25 years of invasion, civil war, oppression and foreign-inspired terrorism. This time, Afghan authorities bear the full responsibility for fulfilling their people's right to choose their leaders, with the international community assisting, not leading. But none of this will matter unless the voters have a real choice and know what each candidate stands for. There must be a serious debate among the candidates and by the Afghan people.

The issues at stake are numerous and weighty. How will the next president finish building a strong army and police force respected by the people and fully capable of providing security? Can the nation's wealth be used for investment and development in an accountable manner? How will young people be educated and trained to develop the human capital that Afghanistan needs to mo! ve forward? What policies will be adopted to encourage the return to A fghan society of those who renounce ties with international terrorism and the use of force while accepting the constitution of the nation? What are the candidates' ideas for governing Afghanistan; how, for example, should the provincial councils evolve to give a real voice to Afghans across the land? And how can the international community better partner with Afghanistan to achieve peace, justice and economic progress?

In March, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy that includes a major commitment of American men and women -- civilian and military -- to Afghanistan, as well as important new financial contributions to help accelerate development. We will continue to work with the next Afghan administration to field capable and sufficient Afghan National Army and police units; to support effective government personnel systems; to help combat corruption; to provide financial assistance to key Afghan institutions; to promote agricultural development; to address de! tention issues; to support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts; and to fix contracting practices. All of these efforts must be underpinned by accountability on both sides. The international community looks forward to strengthening its partnership with whichever candidate emerges from the elections, based upon a renewed spirit of cooperation.

So it is not just the Afghan people who need to understand the candidates' platforms and plans. We members of the international community need to know these things, too. The United States is one nation among a great partnership of more than 40 NATO and non-NATO countries that have joined with the people and government of Afghanistan. We have lost our sons and daughters, just as Afghans have, and we have invested significant development assistance during difficult economic times. Our commitment is extraordinary and long term. We are prepared to forge ahead based on common interests and mutual obligations. We stand with absolute impar! tiality regarding who should be president of Afghanistan. But all of u s will benefit from clarity as to what policy goals we should expect from the next administration.

This is an exciting time to be in Afghanistan. Walking through the bazaars of Helmand, Wardak, Kunduz, Herat, Uruzgan, Khost and numerous other provinces where the Afghan people are defending against destabilizing forces, I have seen their hope and thirst for progress. Candidates -- some prominent, some relatively new to the national stage -- are for the most part embracing their responsibility to discuss the issues. Ongoing televised debates remind me that, though we may be separated by barriers of language and culture, the democratic process in Afghanistan is like our own: an intense competition of political ideas to the benefit of the common citizen.

On Aug. 20, Afghan men and women will travel great distances -- in some cases, unfortunately, under threat of attack -- to make their voices heard. In the final weeks of this election season, the Afghan people deserv! e to know the platforms and implementation plans of each candidate. And so do we. The stakes are high and the opportunity great for all of us. The Afghan people and international community must be positioned to move quickly in partnership immediately after the inauguration of Afghanistan's next president. We have no time to lose as we work together to deliver peace, justice, economic opportunity and regional understanding.

It is time for a serious debate.

The writer is the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. He has served five years in the country in civilian and military capacities, including as commander of international forces from 2005 to 2007.

Marines in 'Stan - The Fight Today

Marines In Afghanistan Using Ancient Fortress As Base

CNN Sunday Morning, 7:00 AM

T.J. HOLMES: Now, U.S. Marines have been battling the Taliban for control of southern Afghanistan's rural area. One group of Marines is holding an ancient castle attacked over the years, with everything from arrows to air strikes.

BROOKE BALDWIN: We sent our own Ivan Watson there. He has this exclusive look at how a fledgling struggling local government is coming together behind the ancient mud walls.

I! VAN WATSON: There is a timeless quality to Afghanistan. Sometimes, you really feel like you're going back in time when you visit here and now more than ever. Because we're walking on the ramparts of a centuries-old Afghan fortress. A mud and brick fortress complete with what look like arrow loops of some sort.

And the remarkable thing about this structure is that the U.S. Marines, a modern fighting force, are using this as a military base. They are protecting themselves behind these walls from insurgents who have been operating out in the fields and the canals and gullies out there.

The insurgents have fired rocket-propelled grenades at this location. They fired small arms as well. And they've lobbed deadly mortars into this castle.

We had a loud night in the castle last night because the marines were hunting for a suspected insurgent mortar team out in the fields beyond the walls. And to help the patrols out there, they were firing illumination rounds fro! m mortar tubes, that was deafening.

Anyway, the work that's bein g done here is so important because there's an experiment underway. Within the walls of the castle are the beginnings of a fledgling district government, with representatives from the ministry of health and education, as well as Afghan National Police officers and Afghan National Army soldiers, and they are part of the ticket for an exit of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. It's got to grow up here, this local government, in an area that was, until just a few weeks ago, controlled by the Taliban.

And that makes the work that these men are doing right here in this guard tower so important. They are protecting this experiment in establishing an Afghan government from the insurgents in the fields just out there.

PFC. RICHARD REED, U.S. MARINE CORPS: The day before yesterday, we had a couple of mortar rounds hit right outside the post and also inside the castle.

WATSON: And have you had to retaliate? Have you actually seen any of the fighters?

REED: Yes. We h! ad a man suspected of being the fort observer for them right outside here, probably about 1,200 meters.

CPL. ADAM TRANTHAM, U.S. MARINE CORPS: My job here is to help the Delta Company with their indirect fire. So, I have a part in help to deter these mortars that they have been firing at us, sir. We came up here and spotted their forward observer. We returned fire. And, hopefully, we deterred them.

WATSON: Make no mistake. This is incredibly, difficult, dangerous work.

And the Marines who have been here with the Delta Company of the 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion have not had an easy time over the past two weeks. Three of their comrades have been killed in two separate incidents during what has been the bloodiest month yet of this eight-year war in Afghanistan. The U.S. has had record losses this month as have NATO forces. This is the season for fighting, summer in Afghanistan, and the summer is far from over.

Ivan Watson, CNN, Khan Neshi n in southern Afghanistan.

Press Release from Camp Leatherneck

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 19, 2009
PRESS RELEASE 09-07
CAMP LEATHERNECK, Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan –

Afghan National Army soldiers and U.S. Marines from Regimental Combat Team 3, Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, conducted a raid on a known insurgent stronghold July 18 in the town of Lakari, Garmsir District.

The raid force uncovered several weapons caches – including supplies used in making improvised explosive devices – and a stockpile of Afghan National Army uniforms, used by insurgents in ambush attacks. The force also included members of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit supported by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and discovered a significant quantity of illegal drugs, which help fund the insurgents.

There were no reports of ANA or civilian casualties, or damage to civilian property.

Tom Friedman & Afghanistan

Teacher, Can We Leave Now? No.
By Thomas L. Friedman
New York Times
July 19, 2009

Pushghar, Afghanistan--I confess, I find it hard to come to Afghanistan and not ask: Why are we here? Who cares about the Taliban? Al Qaeda is gone. And if its leaders come back, well, that’s why God created cruise missiles.

But every time I start writing that column, something stills my hand. This week it was something very powerful. I watched Greg Mortenson, the famed author of “Three Cups of Tea,” open one of his schools for girls in this remote Afghan village in the Hindu Kush mountains. I must say, after witnessing the delight in the faces of those little Afghan girls crowded three to a desk waiting to learn, I found it very hard to write, “Let’s just get out of here.”

Indeed, Mortenson’s efforts remind us what the essence of the “war on terrorism” is about. It’s about the war of ideas within Islam — a war between religious zealots who glorify martyrdom and want to keep Islam untouched by modernity and isolated from other faiths, with its women disempowered, and those who want to embrace modernity, open Islam to new ideas and empower Muslim women as much as men. America’s invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were, in part, an effort to create the space for the Muslim progressives to fight and win so that the real engine of change, something that takes nine months and 21 years to produce — a new generation — can be educated and raised differently.

Which is why it was no accident that Adm. Mike Mullen, the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — spent half a day in order to reach Mortenson’s newest school and cut the ribbon. Getting there was fun. Our Chinook helicopter threaded its way between mountain peaks, from Kabul up through the Panjshir Valley, before landing in a cloud of dust at the village of Pushghar. Imagine if someone put a new, one-story school on the moon, and you’ll appreciate the rocky desolateness of this landscape.

But there, out front, was Mortenson, dressed in traditional Afghan garb. He was surrounded by bearded village elders and scores of young Afghan boys and girls, who were agog at the helicopter, and not quite believing that America’s “warrior chief” — as Admiral Mullen’s title was loosely translated into Urdu — was coming to open the new school.

While the admiral passed out notebooks, Mortenson told me why he has devoted his life to building 131 secular schools for girls in Pakistan and another 48 in Afghanistan: “The money is money well spent. These are secular schools that will bring a new generation of kids that will have a broader view of the world. We focus on areas where there is no education. Religious extremism flourishes in areas of isolation and conflict.

“When a girl gets educated here and then becomes a mother, she will be much less likely to let her son become a militant or insurgent,” he added. “And she will have fewer children. When a girl learns how to read and write, one of the first things she does is teach her own mother. The girls will bring home meat and veggies, wrapped in newspapers, and the mother will ask the girl to read the newspaper to her and the mothers will learn about politics and about women who are exploited.”

It is no accident, Mortenson noted, that since 2007, the Taliban and its allies have bombed, burned or shut down more than 640 schools in Afghanistan and 350 schools in Pakistan, of which about 80 percent are schools for girls. This valley, controlled by Tajik fighters, is secure, but down south in Helmand Province, where the worst fighting is today, the deputy minister of education said that Taliban extremists have shut 75 of the 228 schools in the last year. This is the real war of ideas. The Taliban want public mosques, not public schools. The Muslim militants recruit among the illiterate and impoverished in society, so the more of them the better, said Mortenson.

This new school teaches grades one through six. I asked some girls through an interpreter what they wanted to be when they grow up: “Teacher,” shouted one. “Doctor,” shouted another. Living here, those are the only two educated role models these girls encounter. Where were they going to school before Mortenson’s Central Asia Institute and the U.S. State Department joined with the village elders to get this secular public school built? “The mosque,” the girls said.

Mortenson said he was originally critical of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he’s changed his views: “The U.S. military has gone through a huge learning curve. They really get it. It’s all about building relationships from the ground up, listening more and serving the people of Afghanistan.”

So there you have it. In grand strategic terms, I still don’t know if this Afghan war makes sense anymore. I was dubious before I arrived, and I still am. But when you see two little Afghan girls crouched on the front steps of their new school, clutching tightly with both arms the notebooks handed to them by a U.S. admiral — as if they were their first dolls — it’s hard to say: “Let’s just walk away.” Not yet.

Pakistani Problems Threatening Afghanistan

Extremists In Pakistan Putting US Afghan Strategy In Jeopardy
By Robert Burns, Associated Press
Arizona Daily Star (Tucson)

WASHINGTON — A central pillar of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan — enlisting Pakistan to eliminate extremist havens on its side of the border — is being tested so severely it calls into question the viability of the entire plan.

When President Obama announced on March 27 his approach to turning around the war in Afghanistan, he said stronger action by neighboring Pakistan against Taliban sanctuaries on its soil was "indispensable." He called the insurgent-infested border area "the most dangerous place in the world."

Since then, extremists have not only held their own on the border but have made inroads toward Pakistan's capital.

The extremists, including Pakistani elements of the Taliban, are not a homogenous force; some elements are focused more on infiltrating Afghanistan to contest control of that country, while others are oriented toward destabilizing Pakistan. But in either case the trends are growing more worrisome for an Obama administration that has decided the Afghan problem cannot be fixed without progress in Pakistan.

Reports of a pullback Friday from the militants' latest advances toward Islamabad were greeted with measured relief in Washington, but there remains a worry that the Pakistani government is failing to deal forcefully with Islamist fighters slowly advancing toward the heart of the nuclear-armed country.

Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said developments in Pakistan have caused "deep anxiety" among administration officials — "and a worry about the viability, frankly, of any Afghan strategy, not just this one."

There seem to be few other options for the U.S. in Pakistan. It has used periodic missile attacks from Predator drone aircraft to strike extremist leadership targets, but more direct military action would seem unlikely. Obama has pledged to provide more financial and other non-military support, while warning Islamabad that U.S. patience is limited.

Obama made the calculation that Pakistan's sovereignty must be respected and therefore U.S. ground forces would not be used inside Pakistan against the extremists, including elements of the al-Qaida network whose leaders are believed to be operating on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan.

He said Pakistan, with U.S. help, must show its commitment to making progress against the extremists.

Since Obama laid out that strategy, Pakistan arguably has regressed, endangering one pillar of the U.S. plan. The other pillars are a U.S. military and civilian buildup in Afghanistan and a redoubling of U.S. and allied efforts to train an Afghan security force capable of handling the insurgency on its own.

David W. Barno, a former top commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, says extremists threaten to upend the very existence of Pakistan.

"Events in Pakistan are spiraling out of control," Barno told Congress on Thursday, "and our options in reversing the downward acceleration are limited at best."

U.S. officials have sought, with limited success, to nudge the Pakistani government toward confronting the extremists. The frustration was evident in Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's assertion to Congress on Wednesday that the Pakistanis are "basically abdicating" to the extremists.

At least as cutting were comments Friday in Afghanistan by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I'm increasingly both concerned and frustrated at the progression of the danger," he said in an NBC News interview one day after meeting with Pakistani officials.

What it's like in Afghanistan

Western Troops' Finest Foe In Southern Afghanistan

Los Angeles Times
March 17, 20

It gets in their engines, their sleeping bags, even between their teeth. There is no escaping this gritty menace.

By Laura King

COMBAT POST BARROW, AFGHANISTAN -- Thousands of U.S. and other Western troops in the south of Afghanistan do battle daily with a foe far more ubiquitous than Taliban insurgents: dust.

Chalky and powdery, it fouls engines and electronic gear. It seeps through the seams of clothing and sleeping bags. It cakes dry lips, stains sweaty faces and coats the interiors of tents and armored vehicles.

Food and water take on a gritty tang. With the consistency of talc, the dust of southern Afghanistan is billowy when dry, slimy when wet, with a concrete-hard crust when it re-dries. Locals use it to build the durable mud-brick compounds that dot the desert, home to Afghan civilians and combatants alike.

Inert, the dust presents an infinite-seeming horizon, particularly eerie when viewed through night-vision goggles. Whipped by wind into funnel clouds that can reach hundreds of feet in the air, it is the bane of military aviators.

Choking clouds of it are kicked up whenever convoys roll past or helicopters land. At one remote U..S. Marine base, a visitor was cheerfully informed, "You'll be coughing up mud balls for a week!"

Dust played a well-documented role in ancient warfare, serving as a kind of antique early-warning system. Some generals used guile to make their approaching armies appear larger than they were, creating huge dust clouds with mules dragging bundles of branches.

In a modern-day setting, the vast, bare expanse of Afghan desert provides little cover for insurgents; even a small band of fighters can be readily sighted. But Western convoys, too, are visible for miles, with their signature halo of dust.

In rustic military outposts where indoor and outdoor living blur together, any piece of gear left unattended acquires a film of fine grit within moments. Undisturbed for a day or two, mundane objects like plastic-wrapped crates of drinking water come to resemble relics of a lost civilization.

Despite the primitive living conditions, military outposts are hives of high-tech equipment: surveillance cameras that sweep the surrounding desert, monitors relaying footage from unmanned aerial drones. All need constant cleaning or they will become dust-clogged -- "canned air saves us," said Marine Pfc. Conor Wood of Ronkonkoma, N.Y.

When a desert dust storm sweeps through, it can take with it almost anything that isn't tied down, and sometimes things that are. This month, Marines at a forward operating base in Farah province built an open-sided mess hall, but had only a few days to admire their handiwork before a sandstorm blew the roof off.

With dust as a daily companion, personal hygiene is a losing battle. Grit insinuates its way into crevices between teeth -- and among the bristles of toothbrushes used to scrub them. And woe betide any wearer of contact lenses.

There's no plumbing in the remotest outposts, only solar showers that deliver a chilly deluge few wish to brave. Many Marines go months without a shower, growing more dust-crusted by the day. They launder their own fatigues, one said, "when the pants are standing up, waiting for you to climb into them."

Springtime is the season of sandstorms, and in the open desert, they approach as a ghostly vision, turning the air yellowish, then greenish, then black.

"At 1500 hours [3 p.m.], it was like the middle of the night," said Navy medical corpsman Joshua Steinhilber of Webster, N.Y., describing a dirt-blasted tempest that recently swept through. "We figured it had to be either the Apocalypse or a dust storm bearing down," he said. "So a dust storm -- that was fine."

King was recently on assignment in Afghanistan..