CMC: In Iraq, but ready for Afghanistan!

Top Marine Checks Troops In Two Wars
By Lara Jakes, Associated Press

CAMP RAMADI, Iraq -- The top U.S. Marine is checking on troops in one war zone as he gets ready to send more to the next.

Gen. James Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps, visited Iraq this week on his way to Afghanistan, where the United States is considering adding more troops. Many of the fresh-faced Marines who met Conway are serving their first combat mission - and already are looking forward to the next battle.

They are part of a force that, between the years in Iraq and Afghanistan, could be fighting wars for a generation.

At a hot and dusty base outside Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar province, Conway made clear he does not yet know whether Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, will add to the 68,000 American troops already scheduled to be there by the end of the year. But Conway told the Marines he wants them to be ready.

"I'll be surprised if we don't get asked for more," Conway said. He predicted "more combat support in there."

McChrystal is preparing a review of his war - and his needs for fighting it. He is expected to deliver that review to the Pentagon by early September. Defense Secretary Robert Gates last week said the review will not address troop levels, but military officials privately believe McChrystal ultimately will ask for as many as 20,000 additional soldiers.

U.S. troops first invaded Afghanistan in 2001 after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and Iraq two years later. Although the United States is committed to pulling its combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, military officials and experts believe the battle in Afghanistan easily could last for up to a decade longer.

That has required the Pentagon to rethink how to prepare its forces. The Army is recruiting 22,000 new soldiers and extending time at home for troops returning from battle. The Marines are making physical fitness more rigorous for those headed into combat.

Marines being Marines - a force that prides itself on running from one fight to the next - appear eager to head from Iraq to Afghanistan. An estimated 13,200 Marines remain in Iraq, and the vast majority of them will be gone by Thanksgiving. About 11,400 Marines are currently in Afghanistan.

"We're an expeditionary force; we're very offensive-minded, and it would be a better use of our time to be in Afghanistan," said Capt. John Roma, commander of a Marine company that deployed to Iraq just two weeks ago. It's his second tour of duty in Iraq; he has also fought in Afghanistan.

"But we still have a job to do here, and we're doing it to the best of our ability."

All troops will receive at least as much time at home between deployments as they spent in combat, meaning those currently in Iraq will not go to Afghanistan immediately.

Whether the U.S. should send more troops to Afghanistan is part of a simmering debate in Washington over how much money, and ultimately, time should be spent on the war. A recent policy paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, warned against shortchanging the war in Afghanistan.

"Adequate resources win in Iraq, inadequate resources lose in Afghanistan: Late in one case, still waiting in the other," the CSIS paper concluded.

Under a security agreement with the Iraqi government, U.S. troops no longer operate in Iraqi cities without permission or escort by local Iraqi forces. In Anbar, that means Marines have scaled back their missions to the point of being bored, even though violence between Iraqis continues.

A pair of deadly bombs this week in Baghdad killed nearly 100 people and wounded hundreds more. In July 2007, 203 coalition forces were killed by improvised explosive devices, military figures show. By comparison, IED blasts killed nine troops last month.

But security remains fragile, and some local Iraqi officials are evasive about whether they want Americans to help protect them from insurgents and other threats even as the troops prepare to move on.

Saeed Hamadan, mayor-elect of Hit, in Anbar, said Baghdad gets the most attention but his city faces the same threats as the rest of Iraq. "We see explosions every day," Hamadan said in his office last week.

In an interview with The Associated Press, Conway said that in Afghanistan up to 700 troops should be added or, at the least, retasked to focus on IED attacks. He estimates such attacks have caused 80 percent of Marine deaths since May, when the U.S. launched a major offensive against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.

He would not discuss how many troops ultimately could be added to the fight, except to say that he does not want it to go beyond 18,000 more Marines, or he won't be able to protect the length of Marines' time at home between war zones.

"The most important thing that's happening is right here in Iraq," Conway said during a question-and-answer session with troops at Camp Taqqadum air base, 35 miles west of Baghdad. "The most difficult thing that's happening for our Corps today is in Afghanistan. And I think we're going to be there for a while, and if you all want to go to Afghanistan - that's been my experience from talking to most Marines - then you may well get that chance."

Massive Voter Fraud by Karzai

No Sign Of Voters On Election Day In Afghanistan Despite Official Claims
By Tom Coghlan, in Pul-e-Charki, Kabul
London Times
August 21, 2009

At 8am, an hour after the Afghanistan's presidential polls opened, the polling station at the Haji Janat Gul High School, a dusty collection half-finished buildings designated for use by Kuchi nomads, was entirely empty of voters.

But the apparent lack of voter activity was deceptive, insisted election officials; the ballot boxes were already full almost to the brim. "The people have already come. They came here with lorries at 7 am, now they have gone to the fields with their sheep" said Lawan Geen proudly.

The grey bearded election worker from the Independent Election Commission seemed rather less than happy at the unannounced arrival of two Times journalists at his polling centre just outside Kabul.

The absence of voters witnessed by The Times yesterday in this centre on the edge of the capital was replicated across the country, with fearful Afghans staying away from the polls after repeated threats from the Taleban.

But the polling station in Pul-e-Charki painted a suspiciously different picture. In total 5,530 votes had already been cast for the Presidential Elections, according to the records being kept by the election staff beside each ballot box. In each box there were an oddly uniform 500 to 510 votes. More impressive still, some 3,025 of the ballots were womens votes.

Assuming that the last voter disappeared at least two minutes before the Times arrived at 7.55am, the staff working on the 12 separate ballot boxes at the site must have been processing at least 100 voters per minute since polling began.

There were no sign of any election monitors at the site and nor were there any female staff to oversee the women?s ballot boxes, as the electoral commission required.

For an hour The Times waited at the polling site. The polling staff fidgeted. But no one came to vote.

"This area is controlled by Haji Mullah Lewani Khan. He is the chief of the Tarokhail tribe and an MP" said Lawan Geen, the election official. "He said that there is a threat from the Taleban to cut the fingers off the people. So people came early in the morning" he added, hopping from one foot to the other, looking uncomfortable.

The tribal chief, he confided, was a supporter of President Karzai. “All the people here are Tarokhail, they are all voting for Karzai.” His co-workers were unhelpful. “You are not allowed to see these things, this is a woman?s area” said one male worker as The Times asked to see the lists of voter card numbers for ballots already cast.

Suddenly a lorry chugged into view. “Look there are voters!” shouted Lawan Geen, scampering towards the approaching vehicle. About thirty men were helped off the lorry, several were elderly and one was almost entirely blind. They trooped into the polling station and prepared to vote.

A burly middle-aged man called Lal Mohammad stepped forward and held out two voting cards. At the sight the election officials went into collective convulsion and shooed one back into his pocket.

After he had voted he explained that he had voted for President Karzai. Asked about the second voting card in his pocket he showed the contents of his several other pockets before finally pulling out the card. "It is my wife's," he said. "I will bring her later."

Other voters also said they were voting for Mr Karzai. "If Doctor Abdullah wins it will be a shame on all Pashtun people because he is a Tajik" said Haji Abdullah, a pistol-toting young man who looked about 16 but whose voter registration card put him at 21. He insisted that he was old enough to vote, pointing out that he had voted in 2004. “Maybe Afghanistan will be destroyed if he wins,” he added. “Certainly there will be fighting.”

As the thirty voters each made their way to the ballot box it became evident that the staff were able to process a maximum four voters every three minutes, or at best 80 voters per ballot box per hour, or 960 for the entire polling centre per hour. How was it possible then to process 5,530 in an hour, The Times wondered. Did the election officials suspect any sort of fraud?

Lawan Geen pursed his lips. "Maybe there has been a little bit by some people. Maybe 5 per cent," he ventured.

Outside the polling station five policemen stood guard. They had been at the station since the night before and explained what they had seen. “At about 4am the IEC staff came to the polling station,” said one policeman named Iqbal. “Since then we haven?t seen a lot of people. Maybe four lorries of people and three or four Corolla cars. I have not seen any women here.” The other policemen corroborated the tale.

A mile away The Times found the tribal chief Haji Mullah Lewani Khan MP in his grand, high-walled compound. Thirty metres from his front door was another polling station in the Haji Janat Gul Madrassa. Both were buildings originally built by Mr Lewani in memory of his father.

Outside the madrassa polling centre stood half a dozen armed men, supporters of Mr Lewani. One of them wore a badge with Mr Karzai?s face on it.

Mr Lewani, a diminutive 35-year-old with a regal air, welcomed The Times with a large group of retainers at his shoulder, several of whom wore the blue armbands, meant to mark them out as Independent Election Commission workers. All such workers are supposed to be vetted for their impartiality.

"They are helping the IEC just for today," said Haji Mullah casually. "They are not getting any wages." His two phones rang continuously. "We need more ballot papers," he shouted into one. "Call the election commission and tell them we need more." Asked if he had voted, the MP replied: “Of course, for Karzai.” Oddly none of his fingers displayed any of the indelible ink used to identify those who had voted. “I washed my hands,” he said.

What did he think of suggestions that vote rigging might be taking place locally, wondered The Times. “These claims of corruption are just shit, maybe they are publicity against us by Dr Abdullah supporters,” he said without blinking.

An hour after voting closed last night sources from the Independent Election Commission admitted that an investigation had begun into allegations that up to 70,000 illegal votes had been cast in polling centres around the Haji Janat Gul polling centre, east of Kabul.

Gen Jones: Our Goals in Aghanistan

We Have Clarity In Our Goals
Administration takes fight to the extremists, denies them havens.By Gen James Jones, USMC, Ret.
White House National Security Adviser
USA Today
August 20, 2009

Today's election serves as another reminder that the future of Afghanistan lies in the hands of Afghans, and that significant challenges remain. President Obama's recently announced strategy is focused on protecting America's and our allies' security interests, while advancing a successful transition to Afghans' responsibility for their country.

First, there should be no doubt about the clear U.S. goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the collaboration of both countries, al-Qaeda and the extremists who attacked us on 9/11 are feeling relentless pressure. But should the Taliban be successful in its goal to take over Afghanistan again, there is no question that we and our allies would again be unacceptably threatened. That is why the president is focused on taking a comprehensive fight to the terrorists, and denying them the safe havens they seek. Al-Qaeda and its allies will not be successful if recent trends in executing our strategy continue.

To achieve our goals, the president has put in place a comprehensive strategy supported by the international community. We have increased troop strength in Afghanistan, while increasing support to the Pakistani government in going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the border. In just a few months, we have put the Taliban on the defensive in places where it used to act with impunity, and many of its top commanders are now forced to wonder whether each day will be their last. Our increased military capacity has joined with NATO allies in accelerating the training of the Afghan army and police, so that they can take over responsibility for security at an accelerated pace.

We and our allies have also stepped up civilian support. By advancing the economy, encouraging individual opportunity and strengthening governance from the smallest village to Kabul, we isolate extremists, put a dent in a drug trade that funds insurgents and help establish security. To succeed, these pillars — security, the economy and governance — must advance in unison. We are joined in this effort by 47 countries and institutions such as NATO, the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank. This will sustain a shared, international commitment to Afghanistan's future.

I served in command of NATO's efforts in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2006, and have studied this war as a private citizen. This is the first time in seven years that we have had clarity in our goals, and a strategy and resources necessary to get the job done. We won't solve every problem; we are pursuing the possible, not the perfect. But this is not simply an "American war" — it is an international effort to rid the region of the ravages of extremism to protect ourselves and our allies, while giving the Afghan people the opportunity to control their future.

The president has been clear that this won't be easy, but it is necessary. It will take great sacrifice — especially by our men and women in uniform, our dedicated civilians who work alongside them at great risk, and their families who suffer long separations. But we are pointed in the right direction, we are protecting our people, and we are doing what is necessary to achieve our goals and bring our troops home as soon as possible.

Not Enough Canadians, faulty US strategy

In Taliban Heartland, Coalition's Made Little Headway After 8 Years

By Nancy A. Youssef, McClatchy Newspapers
August 16, 2009

ZHARI DISTRICT, Afghanistan — Two miles from the gates of an isolated Canadian military base in southern Afghanistan lies Sangsar, the village where the Taliban's harsh interpretation of Islam was born.

A few miles farther east is Siah Choy, where students learn to build roadside bombs for passing U.S. and Afghan troops. About six miles further east, in Nakhonay, the Taliban store thousands of weapons to distribute in the region.

This fertile part of southern Afghanistan is the front line of the war between the American-led coalition and the Taliban. Yet neither the U.S. nor its coalition partners have any troops stationed in these villages.

The Taliban's grip here is so strong that Afghan government leaders can't live in their own villages, so the farmers turn to the militants to settle local disputes. When Afghans go to the polls next Thursday to pick a president, no one here will vote because the Taliban have ordered them to stay home.

The coalition's precarious position in Kandahar province after nearly eight years of a war that's claimed more than 775 American lives is a warning that the new U.S. campaign to subdue the Taliban in the Islamists' heartland will be, at best, an uphill struggle.

Later this month, soldiers from the 5th Brigade of the Army's 2nd Infantry Division out of Fort Lewis, Wash., will take control of this base, part of an American troop increase that Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has said is key to wresting control from the Taliban.

But the tactics the U.S. honed in Iraq will be of little or no use here, where roadways are either dusty, unpaved tracks or simply dry creek beds and where the terrian is lush, Vietnam-like, capable of growing grapes, opium poppies and marijuana, yet fiercely hot — temperatures easily reach 130 degrees in the summer and soldiers walk a few hundred yards and collapse before a shot is fired.

And the Canadians who have been here for the past three years are openly skeptical that their U.S. brethren, with huge eight-wheeled Stryker armored fighting vehicles in the lush waist-high grape vines, will have any better luck subduing the Taliban than they did.

The Americans "need to understand this is the toughest environment" they'll face, said Capt. Chris Blouin of Canada's Royal 22nd Regiment. "It's not complicated. Expect everything."

For three years, a Canadian force of a few hundred has faced as many as 15,000 Taliban here. In those three years, however, the Canadians acknowledge that they've had little more than a "finger in the dike strategy" aimed at preventing Taliban forces from capturing Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city, 20 miles to the east. With few resources, stalemate was the Canadians' strategy.

America's allies have no territorial gains to show for the effort. The schools they built were destroyed after the Taliban took them over and used them to stage ambushes. The small outposts they established, including the one in Sangsar, were abandoned in 2007 under constant Taliban attack.

"All we were really able to do, and have been able to do, is keep the insurgency sufficiently at bay that it doesn't become a real challenge to the state," said Canadian Brig. Gen. Jonathan Vance, who commands 2,800 troops in Kandahar province, about 300 of them based in Sangsar. "And it's not a real challenge to the state."

The Canadians' efforts to guide and train their Afghan counterparts who share this base have been equally frustrating.

At a meeting of local elders last month on the Afghan side of the base, Canadian and Afghan soldiers and police officers sat around a table laden with Oreos and pretzels mixed with dried apricots and figs.

The local police chief, Bizmullah Jan, asked for more help from the Canadians. The Canadians' lack of troops, however, makes it hard for them to support the Afghans the way the Afghans would like.

"Your troops need to understand that they are better fighters than the Taliban, and the Taliban are not good fighters...the Taliban have an ammo issue as well," said Blouin, 31, of Quebec, who's assigned to the Bravo Company in the 2nd Battalion of Canada's Royal 22nd Regiment. "Don't shoot everywhere. This is your country, and you need to be out the wire (in front) first."

The local Afghan army chief, Lt. Col Miranwar, who like many Afghans uses only one name, chimed in: "You have the technology, the best technology, but every time the Taliban fight, you cannot find them...you say you are here to help and support us, so we need support and help from you."

Blouin didn't budge. "It is chaotic on the ground, and there are too many people, so I cannot see who is the enemy. . . . It is a mistake to count too much on the technology because the Taliban doesn't have technology."

"Yes, but the Taliban have the authority over the whole area," Miranwar replied.

The Canadians are bitter about their role. They've lost 125 soldiers — the highest proportionally of any coalition partner — and have killed thousands of Taliban fighters and hundreds more civilians in short bursts of operations, usually lasting a few days.

Now they feel the clock ticking: They have two years to make a lasting difference before political pressure probably will force them to go home. Canada's politicians have said that their combat forces will leave Afghanistan by the end of 2011.

"We are proud to have been here. This is the heart of the insurgency," said Capt. Christian Maranda, 30, of Quebec and of Bravo Company. "But of course it's frustrating, because we lose ground every time we lose an area."

The local population has lost hope that the coalition can wrest control from the Taliban fighters who hide in their fields and take over their homes. Afghans resent the Canadians for making their lives more difficult. They've seen civilians killed. Their districts aren't safe. Canadian soldiers often have driven off the roads and destroyed farmers' 100-year-old grapevines in an effort to dodge the explosives that are waiting for them.

"Every yard is a trench for the enemy. . . . The people don't think about government and elections. The people now are just trying to save themselves," said district leader Naiz Mohammed Abdul Sarahadi, who splits his time between the base and Kandahar city because his district is too dangerous for him.

"Whenever there are more coalition forces, there are more deaths. These operations should have a result. We have an operation, and the Taliban move back in."

Taliban wearing flip-flops and carrying AK-47 rifles and rocket launchers have the small Canadian forward operating base near Zhari surrounded, but how many of them there are is anyone's guess. Blouin has heard 15,000. Harassment fire is common, usually beginning in midmorning, from men a few hundred yards from the base.

Every time the Taliban appear, Canadian medics who've grown accustomed to the routine put on their bright blue plastic gloves and booties, stand in front of stretchers laid out in a barren outdoor medical center and await the inevitable casualties.

The Taliban have no chance of overrunning the base, but they're sending a message to the villagers: They, not the foreign forces, are in charge of this area. They'll launch another two attacks outside the base before the week is over.

The longest land battle of this Afghan war took place just south of here in September 2006. The Canadians call it the Battle of Medusa, and they say that hundreds of Taliban were killed, along with 12 Canadian soldiers. Some think that battle, the most conventional fight between the Canadian Forces and the Taliban, stopped the Taliban from moving toward the city of Kandahar.

It was the apex of the Canadian effort here. The Canadians tried to keep the momentum going, but they lost it quickly because they didn't have enough troops.

Throughout their time here, the Canadians have pleaded for more troops and resources. They asked for more helicopters but never got them. They pleaded with the Americans to send a new Marine brigade here, only to see it go to neighboring Helmand and Farah provinces.'

Their only reinforcements came last year, when a Canadian commission found that Canada couldn't continue its mission without another 1,000 soldiers. The Americans sent 750 troops plus logistical support to the neighboring Maiwand district and the Canadians agreed to stay for another three years.

They built schools in the community, but NATO destroyed them after the Taliban took them over and used them to stage ambushes. They then set up small outposts, including the one in Sangsar. The Canadians found that they spent most of their effort protecting the outposts, so by early 2007 they moved back to their main base near Zhari.

No coalition soldier has been stationed in the birthplace of the Taliban since then.

Instead, the Canadians have launched one small operation after another, sweeping through the district village by village, operation by operation, back and forth. They've hit each of the district's villages at least twice, once before and once after the warm-weather fighting season. The aim is to capture enough weapons to force the Taliban to search for more instead of driving toward Kandahar.

"We have to hit certain places several times just to keep them off balance," said Cpl. Gary-James Johnston, 27, of Montreal.

Canadian soldiers serve six-month tours in Afghanistan, half as long as the Americans' tours. Since the 22nd Regiment arrived in late March, it's launched 15 operations. In July, the Canadians conducted three operations, each lasting two to three days.

They struck Taliban staging areas toward Kandahar city, accompanied by Afghan forces. During one operation, word leaked out and the Taliban fled. During the others, the militants simply dropped their weapons and went back to farming. In the last operation in July, the Canadians found one of the largest weapons caches of the war, enough rifles, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition to fill a small building.

Still, they've made only a small dent in the insurgency.

"Yeah, they will be back," Canadian Lt. Col. Michael Patrick said after the latest operation. "We know that."

Together, the Canadian troops and the newly arriving 5th Brigade of the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division will tackle the area's population centers. The Americans will come to Zhari, and the Canadians will move south to neighboring Panjaway district to reinforce their presence there.

"If we adequately secure 80 percent of the population, and the Taliban become irrelevant to 80 percent of the population, then we are well on our way to winning," said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. John Nicholson, the international force's deputy regional south commander and the highest-ranking American military officer in southern Afghanistan.

But McChrystal's advisers quietly concede that the new U.S. strategy may not work, either, and that if more troops are needed, they'll have to be American troops who are leaving Iraq.

"Even today, we don't have enough," a senior military adviser to McChrystal said, speaking only on the condition of anonymity in order to talk more candidly about the situation in Kandahar. "This is all the reality of an under-resourced war, and that's the impact of Iraq."

"We kept a lid on this as best we could, and successfully. The insurgency didn't win," said Brig. Gen. Jonathan Vance, the Canadian commander in Kandahar province.

"Woulda, shoulda, coulda, there would have been more troops here, and there would have been right from the beginning," Vance continued. "But there weren't. So we did exactly what we had to do. Now we have an opportunity...we have two years" before the Canadians are expected to leave Afghanistan. "In two years, you can do a lot."

McChrystal: Cut Staff & Replace with Infantry

General Considers More Afghanistan Fighters:
may swap support forces for combat troops
By Rowan Scarborough
Washington Times
August 14, 2009

The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan is examining whether some support personnel could be replaced by combat forces as a way to increase America's war fighting capacity without requesting a major addition of new troops.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is facing conflicting pressures as he prepares a major strategy review to be delivered to the White House in the coming weeks. A group of outside advisers has recommended that he request as many as 21,000 more troops, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Thursday that the general would not seek additional troops at this time.

There are currently 62,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with 6,000 more expected to arrive by the end of the year. Mr. Gates said at a Pentagon briefing: "We need some time to see what the impact of all that is" before additional troop increases are considered.

He said that Gen. McChrystal is free to ask for whatever resources he feels he needs, but Mr. Gates doesn't expect a request on troop strength in the coming report.

A military source involved in Afghanistan planning told The Washington Times that Gen. McChrystal is exploring as much as a 12% cut in certain manpower slots, a move that would all ow him to request more combatants without substantially increasing the overall troop commitment. The source spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the discussions.

Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell confirmed Thursday that Gen. McChrystal was examining support staff levels.

"Among the things Secretary Gates asked General McChrystal to look at [in his strategy review] was the staff he was inheriting to make sure all his personnel were being used to maximum effect. If we had the means of getting people from behind desks and out into the field, we should take a close look at that," Mr. Morrell told The Times.

Lt. Col. Edward Sholtis, Gen. McChrystal's spokesman, said in an e-mail to The Times that there had been "a direction to identify where such cuts could be made, rather than a decision or direction to actually reduce the force."

"Resource requirements across the theater currently are being analyzed here, but there have been no final decisions or recommendations on numbers of personnel or other resourcing issues."

However, there is a widespread feeling among military specialists that more combat troops are needed to successfully carry through the broader counterinsurgency mission unveiled in March.
Last week, in an interview with editors and reporters of The Times, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he favored the initial Afghanistan surge that began in February.

"We needed to get troops in order to have an impact, particularly this year, because the Taliban's getting tougher, better organized, more sophisticated, better tactics, better intelligence, all those kinds of things. If we delayed that, we would miss a significant period of time to engage them."

A former defense official close to the strategic assessment team of outside specialists told The Times that those advisers are recommending four to six new combat brigades, or up to ! 21,000 troops.

The advisers included such think-tank heavyweight s as Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, who helped President George W. Bush devise the "surge" strategy for Iraq; and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Also in the group are Fred Kagan, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who also helped develop the Iraq surge strategy, and Andrew Exum, a former U.S. Army Ranger who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is a scholar at the Center for a New American Security.

Mr. Morrell said Thursday that there is a big difference between the advice of outside specialists and the recommendations of the commanding general in Afghanistan.

"While their participation I am sure is greatly appreciated by Gen. McChrystal and his team, there is a clear distinction between dispensing advice and the commanding general taking that advice. And given that Gen. McChrystal is still very much in the throes of this assessment, no one, especially these outside advisers, is! in a position to know what he is thinking or is about to decide.

It is simply premature to draw conclusions about what he will present to the defense secretary."

Reached by e-mail Thursday, Mr. Exum wrote, "Any and all recommendations on resources were pending a thorough troop-to-task analysis, which was to take place after we departed Kabul.

"But the assessment was commissioned by the NATO secretary-general and the U.S. secretary of Defense. And if they do not want the commander's recommendation on resources to be included in the report, that is certainly their prerogative."

Mr. Biddle declined to comment to The Times. But in an in-house interview at the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Biddle let it be known that he favors more troops, just as he did for Iraq.

"I certainly continue to think that either course of action - staying or withdrawing - has important problems," he said. "On balance, staying is the better course, but only if we're p! repared to resource it correctly. The weakest argument is staying and under-resourcing it. That creates the opportunity to lose slowly, which is the worst of the three possible approaches."

He added: "One of the central issues for near-term strategy in Afghanistan is, even if the administration substantially increases the number of troops they want in this theater, it's going to be awhile before they can build up to those counts. So for a while to come, we're going to be stuck with too few troops to provide security everywhere."

After returning from Afghanistan, Mr. Cordesman said at a July 29 press conference that the path to victory would require more U.S. brigades, a doubling in the strength of the Afghan army, and reforms to the government.

"We, the United States, are going to have to provide the resources if we want to win," Mr. Cordesman said. "Most of the incremental resources will have to come from us. This means very substantial budget increases, it means more brigade combat troops and it means financing both the civ! ilian effort needed in the field and a near doubling of Afghan national security forces."

The source involved in Afghan planning said he understood that Gen. McChrystal was leaning toward asking his commander, Gen. David H. Petraeus, and Mr. Gates for more combat troops. This source said Gen. McChrystal's staff is now conducting a "troop-to-task" analysis to see if the reinforcements are necessary.

After the outside specialists briefed Gen. McChrystal, he made an unannounced trip Aug. 2 to Brussels to confer with Mr. Gates.

A new troop request, on top of the 21,000 additional troops already approved by Mr. Obama, could touch off a battle between the Army and the White House. Army headquarters at the Pentagon is working to increase rest time for soldiers beyond one year before they redeploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. Having to come up with thousands of more troops would disrupt those plans.

Prior to his remarks Thursday, Mr. Gates appeared to be preparin! g for a new Afghan escalation. He announced in late July that he think s the ongoing Iraq troop withdrawal can be accelerated. He also announced a temporary increase of 22,000 men and women in the active Army.

"I expect the Army to be able to find the new people," said Baker Spring, a defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation. "In my mind, the more serious problem is how the Department of Defense is going to pay for the increase in overall personnel levels and a still-high operational tempo with a topline budget for defense in 2011 that is roughly $70 billion less than in 2010."

The administration's five-year budget plan shows overall defense spending dropping from $692.7 billion in 2010 to $620.5 billion in 2011. It is banking on reduced war costs in Iraq to achieve the reduction.

The White House is cool toward any further Afghan escalation.

Mr. Cordesman rebuked the administration for making dismissive remarks about a troop increase before it sees Gen. McChrystal's report. National Security Adviser James L. Jones said! on Sunday's talk shows that it is too soon to consider such increases.

"Quite frankly, it would probably be just as well if people in the National Security Council and the White House made their judgments after they get the assessment they need rather than try to resource constrain an assessment in a way that can lose the war," he said.

Eli Lake contributed to this report.

Benchmarks for Afghanistan??

Benchmarks Eyed For Afghanistan

U.S. seeks to test effectiveness of surge as skepticism grows
By Anne Gearan, Associated Press

The Obama administration is preparing a set of about 50 benchmarks for Afghanistan, senior officials said Monday, redefining how to measure success in a war now widely assessed as a stalemate.

The be! nchmarks will test how well the U.S. military and civilian "surges" ordered by President Obama are working. They cover Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The new measures, ordered by Congress, are due Sept. 24 amid creeping skepticism among many Democrats about the war's prognosis and costs.

"The deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan is conspicuous," the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote in a report to be released this week. The report notes a record number of U.S. soldiers and Marines died in Afghanistan last month.

"The coming months will test the administration's deepening involvement, its new strategy on counternarcotics specifically and its counterinsurgency effort in general," the senators wrote. "Some observers fear that the moment for reversing the tide in Afghanistan has passed and even a narrow victory will remain out of reach, despite the larger American footprint."

The Afghanistan benchmarks will be more detailed than the I! raq war scorecard used by the George W. Bush administration, a senior administration official said Monday. The White House is circulating a classified version among key lawmakers, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the unreleased document.

The old Iraq yardsticks had an all-or-nothing quality - either the Iraqi government passed a law governing oil resources or it didn't. Many of those tests remain unmet, even as the war there has subsided and U.S. forces prepare to leave.

In writing the Afghan version, Obama advisers say they want to look more broadly, measuring not only what gets done but how well and on what schedule. The benchmarks will include short- and long-term goals. Some will probably be flagged by color - red for things going poorly, green for those going well, the official said.

The reports will be submitted quarterly, with three or four due ahead of the unofficial deadline for measurable progress - 12 to 18 months - outlined by Mr. Obama and his top defense advisers this summer! .

Separately, the newly installed top U.S. general in Afghanistan is preparing an interim assessment that is expected to be a sober accounting of the difficulties of fighting an entrenched and technically capable insurgency eight years into the war.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal is expected to identify shortfalls that should be filled by more forces - perhaps a mix of Afghan, NATO and U.S. Any recommendations for more U.S. forces would come through Gen. McChrystal's boss, Gen. David H. Petraeus.

Estimates of the additions Gen. McChrystal might recommend range from a few thousand to more than 20,000. Gen. McChrystal's predecessor had already asked for an additional 10,000 for next year, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and other top officials made it known they are skeptical.

"We believe that with the strategy and the assets and the infusion of resources, that we're going to be able to achieve our goals," White House spokesman Bill Burton said Monday.

There are 62,000 U.S. troops and 39,000 allied forces in Afghani stan, on top of about 175,000 Afghan soldiers and police. Some NATO countries plan to withdraw their troops in the next few years, even as the United States expands its presence.

Sen Graham: Don't 'Rumsfeld Afghanistan'

Graham: Don't 'Rumsfeld Afghanistan'

Senator Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.)is transforming a former Defense Secretary's name into a derogatory verb and warning that the U.S. needs to deploy the resources needed to keep Afghanistan stable.

"Let's not Rumsfeld Afghanistan. Let’s don’t do this thing on the cheap. Lets have enough combat power and engagement across the board to make sure we’re successful," Graham told CBS's "Face the Nation."

The senator explained that he was alluding to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's support for invading Iraq with a minimal number of U.S. troops.

Graham said he was nearly certain that the Pentagon will ask for more troops to be sent to Afghanistan.

"I will be shocked if more troops are not requested by our commanders," Graham said on CBS. "We must secure more troops….I will shocked if more troops are not needed."

CNN: 3 Brits killed in Helmand

Three British soldiers killed in Afghanistan
CNN: 08:48 AM ET

KABUL, Afghanistan (CNN) — Three members of the British military have been killed in Afghanistan, the British military said Friday.

Three soldiers with Britain’s Parachute Regiment were killed when an explosion hit the vehicle they were traveling in north of Lashkar Gah, in southern Afghanistan, the British Ministry of Defence said in a statement.

A fourth member of their patrol remains in critical condition, the statement said.

Their patrol also was struck by gunfire from militants, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force said.

The force had announced the deaths earlier but did not disclose the nationalities of the service members who were killed.

In other fighting, four Afghan police officers were killed when their patrol was bombed Thursday in Kandahar province, local officials said.

Two other police officers were killed in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, when the Taliban attacked motorcycles.

Afghanistan: How To Define Victory?

White House Struggles To Gauge Afghan Success

By David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker
New York Times
August 7, 2009


WASHINGTON — As the American military comes to full strength in the Afghan buildup, the Obama administration is struggling to come up with a long-promised plan to measure whether the war is being won.

Those “metrics” of success, demanded by Congress and eagerly awaited by the military, are seen as crucial if the president is to convince Capitol Hill and the country that his revamped strategy is working. Without concrete signs of progress, Mr. Obama may lack the political stock — especially among Democrats and his liberal base — to make the case for continuing the military effort or enlarging the American presence.

That problem will become particularly acute if American commanders in Afghanistan seek even more troops for a mission that many of Mr. Obama’s most ardent supporters say remains ill defined and open-ended.

Senior administration officials said that the president’s national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, approved a classified policy document on July 17 setting out nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration’s policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Another month or two is still needed to flesh out the details, according to officials engaged in the work.

General Jones and other top National Security Council aides, including Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, gave an update to top Congressional leaders over recent days.

But as the Bush administration learned the hard way in Iraq, poorly devised measurements can become misleading indicators — and can create a false sense of progress.

That is especially difficult in a war like the one in Afghanistan, in which eliminating corruption, promoting a working democracy and providing effective aid are as critical as scoring military success against insurgents and terrorists.

For instance, some of the measures now being devised by the Obama administration track the size, strength and self-reliance of the Afghan National Army, which the United States has been struggling to train for seven years. They include the number of operations in which Afghan soldiers are in the lead, or the number of Afghan soldiers who have received basic instruction.

White House officials say they are taking the time to get the measurements right.

In some cases, old measurements are being thrown out. Commanders in Afghanistan say they no longer pay much attention to how many enemy fighters are killed in action. Instead, they are trying to count instances in which local citizens cooperate with Afghan and allied forces.

And in drafting a metric important to senior members of Congress, the administration is considering conducting an opinion poll to determine Afghan public perception of official corruption at national, provincial and district levels. This would give insight into how Afghan citizens view police performance at the neighborhood level all the way up to the quality of national political appointments.

But as the architects of similar metrics in Iraq learned, even the best-constructed measures can miss the larger truth.

In 2005 and 2006, for example, the White House was often citing the “rat rate” in Iraq, a measure of good tips from Iraqis about the location of insurgents or the planting of roadside bombs.

“We thought this was a good measure of how well the public was turning against” Al Qaeda and other insurgents, said Peter D. Feaver, a professor at Duke University who served in the National Security Council at the time. “What we discovered was that the rat rate numbers steadily improved over the course of 2006 — and the violence was rising.”

That experience helps to explain why the Obama administration has taken so much time. But some frustrated lawmakers said the delay might prove costly.

“We have been in Afghanistan now for more than seven and a half years,” said Representative Ike Skelton, a Democrat of Missouri and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. “These metrics are required to help make the case for the American people that actual progress is being made, or if we need to change the course to another direction. I think that time is not on our side.”

When President Obama unveiled his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March, he emphasized the importance of these measures.

“We will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable,” Mr. Obama said. “We’ll consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan security forces and our progress in combating insurgents. We will measure the growth of Afghanistan’s economy and its illicit narcotics production. And we will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.”

All that now seems unlikely to be completed before his field commanders finish their proposals for carrying out their marching orders. Their recommendations were originally due at the Pentagon within the next two weeks, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates issued expanded instructions for the assessment to the commanders last weekend and gave them until September to complete their report.

Skeptical lawmakers have implored Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Mr. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to produce what Mr. Obama promised, and they have made specific recommendations of their own.

“The metrics are critically important to keep everyone’s feet to the fire on this and for the public to know how we’re doing and have some ways to measure it and not have just rhetoric,” said Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We all share the president’s goal of succeeding in Afghanistan,” said Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. “The challenge here is how we are going to define success in the medium term, given the difficult security environment we face.”

Senior White House officials say their objectives are grouped in three main categories: counterterrorism, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The counterinsurgency objectives are highly classified and cover a “full range” of efforts to help Pakistan combat the militant threat in its tribal areas.

Others address Pakistan’s ability to maintain and strengthen democratically elected civilian government; the country’s ability to confront and defeat an internal insurgent threat; and international support for Pakistan, including international donors, the United Nations and the World Bank.

In Afghanistan, they would assess suppression of the insurgency; building and strengthening Afghan security forces; shoring up support for the government and reviving the economy; and garnering support from NATO, the European Union, the United Nations and international donors.

More Troops to Afghanistan?

Optimistic Words On Afghanistan

The State Dept was upbeat. More cautious were defense officials. Top brass met Sunday.

By Anne Gearan, Associated Press
August 4, 2009

WASHINGTON -- A day after President Obama's senior defense advisers huddled in Europe to discuss the future of the war in Afghanistan, the State Department yesterday talked optimistically about the conflict that top generals have called a stalemate.

"We believe that this is a struggle that we are now, you know...we have turned a tide," State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said. "We're seeing success in Afghanistan, difficult as it is."

Hours later, five rockets slammed into the Afghan capital, Kabul, one of them near the U.S. Embassy, injuring at least one child, police said. "There's no indication these rockets targeted the U.S. Embassy," an embassy spokeswoman said. She requested anonymity because she was not authorized to release the information.

Crowley's remark came in response to a question about al-Qaeda, the terror network whose shelter in Afghanistan prompted the 2001 U.S.-led invasion. Crowley said later he was "not trying to minimize the complexity" of eventual success in Afghanistan.

Defense and military officials have been circumspect about the situation in Afghanistan in recent months, with some of them characterizing the conflict as stalemated.

Even after adding 21,000 troops to expand its war against Taliban insurgents, top defense and military officials are hashing over whether to ask the White House for even more forces in Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, flew Saturday to a U.S. air base in Chievres, Belgium, and met Sunday with several advisers including Gen. David Petraeus, who has overall responsibility for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Gates and Mullen were given an interim report on security in Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal is putting together an assessment of the war that may include a request for additional U.S. forces and resources.

The trip was organized in secret, and Gates traveled without his usual throng of staff and reporters.

McChrystal's study is expected to recommend a significant expansion of the Afghan armed forces and a reorganization of U.S. and NATO operations. Any request to expand U.S. forces would be on top of the 21,000 increase Obama approved earlier this year.

That brings the total to 68,000 scheduled to be in the country by the end of 2009 - about double the figure at the same time last year.

With 74 foreign troops killed - including 43 Americans - July was the deadliest month for international forces since the start of the war in 2001.

The civilian death toll also climbed yesterday as a Taliban bomb tore through a crowded street in western Afghanistan's main city, Herat, killing 11 people, hurting dozens, and critically wounding the district police chief it targeted, officials said.

UK: In Afghanistan to topple Al-Qaeda

We're In Afghanistan To Topple Al-Qaeda, Says Armed Forces Minister

By Michael Evans, Richard Beeston and Catherine Philp
London Times
August 4, 2009

British troops are fighting in Afghanistan to prevent Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda from using it as a base to plot terror strikes against Britain, a defence minister said yesterday.

Responding to criticism that the Government had failed to explain its strategy in the Afghan campaign, Bill Rammell, the Armed Forces Minister, said British troops were battling against an insurgency that, if it were to succeed, “would provide free rein to the terrorist capacity that inspired, planned and provided support for attacks like those of 9/11, of 7/7, and many more besides”.

Mr Rammell insisted that although al-Qaeda?s main base was now in Pakistan, the presence of British and American troops and forces from 40 other countries in Afghanistan was essential to prevent terrorists surging back into the country. He said that the terrorist threat to Britain would be “significantly greater” if the Taleban were allowed to regain control of Afghanistan, bringing al-Qaeda with it.

“We don?t want to be in Afghanistan for ever, that?s why our strategy is to provide greater security by building up the Afghan National Army, which is currently 90,000 and is rising to 140,000,” he said. Mr Rammell was the latest government minister to try to explain to the public why Britain has 9,000 troops in Afghanistan.

His views were echoed by Nato?s new chief, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former Danish Prime Minister, who called on European countries to match the US commitment and prevent Afghanistan from becoming “a Grand Central Station of international terrorism”.

Mr Rasmussen said that Nato?s survival could depend on more European troops to dispel the perception that Afghanistan was a US operation. “If the Americans are to continue to regard Nato as relevant, so Europe has to do its part,” he said. General Stanley McChrystal, Nato?s top commander in Afghanistan, is preparing to demand thousands more US troops to train and support a vast parallel surge of Afghan troops, placing him on a collision course with President Obama.

General McChrystal, who will submit a review to the White House and Nato headquarters next week, was appointed by Mr Obama in the belief that he would not demand more troops. His demands, though, are backed by Anthony Cordesman, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, who said that without a doubling of Afghan troops, from 150,000 to 300,000, the conflict could be lost.

Middle Eastern counter-terrorist sources said that while Nato was focusing its military effort on Afghanistan, al-Qaeda had been allowed to rebuild itself after the deal signed by Pakistan in 2006 with elders in the tribal regions, which lifted the threat of attack against al-Qaeda. One source told The Times that “2007 was the best year for al-Qaeda since 2001, because many hundreds of foreign volunteers came to fight for them”.

Only the campaign by the Americans, using unmanned Predator spy drones armed with Hellfire missiles and precision-guided bombs, had succeeded in making inroads into the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. In 2008 and so far this year, 20 commanders had been killed, the sources said.

Mr Rammell said that the Government?s strategy embraced Afghanistan and Pakistan. “For Britain to be secure, Afghanistan needs to be secure, Pakistan needs to be secure,” he said, speaking at the Royal United Services Institute in London. “Of the people arrested in connection with terrorist offences in Europe over the past few years, a significant proportion have been trying to engage in insurgencies in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

Some people, he said, believed that the West “brought this on ourselves, that if we hadn?t gone into Afghanistan and Iraq, all would have been well”. He said that George W. Bush, the former US President, could not be blamed for al-Qaeda?s atrocities. “This strand of thinking ignores the reality that the planning of 9/11 took place while Bill Clinton was in the White House and the prospects for peace in the Middle East were closer than they had been for a generation,” he said.

It is understood that a Conservative administration would consider appointing a Minister for Afghanistan who would attend Cabinet meetings when Afghanistan is being discussed and complement the Defence and Foreign Secretaries.

William Hague, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, said: “The Prime Minister must make clear which minister has primary responsibility for our policy in Afghanistan and the Government should make quarterly reports to Parliament, covering Britain?s objectives, the progress made in achieving them and the resources required.”

The Afghan Elections - Amb Karl Eikenberry

In Afghanistan, A Time To Debate And Decide
By Karl W. Eikenberry
Washington Post
August 3, 2009

In the run-up to Afghanistan's presidential and provincial council elections on Aug. 20, Afghan and international political elites and journalists will pass judgment on the past five years. But only the Afghan people can decide who will best lead their country for the next five.

Afghanistan's elections present an opportunity for the country's citizens to create a future of prosperity and peace for their children. Five years ago, with guid! ance from the international community, Afghanistan held its first elections and began the process of building a new state -- a complex and difficult effort following 25 years of invasion, civil war, oppression and foreign-inspired terrorism. This time, Afghan authorities bear the full responsibility for fulfilling their people's right to choose their leaders, with the international community assisting, not leading. But none of this will matter unless the voters have a real choice and know what each candidate stands for. There must be a serious debate among the candidates and by the Afghan people.

The issues at stake are numerous and weighty. How will the next president finish building a strong army and police force respected by the people and fully capable of providing security? Can the nation's wealth be used for investment and development in an accountable manner? How will young people be educated and trained to develop the human capital that Afghanistan needs to mo! ve forward? What policies will be adopted to encourage the return to A fghan society of those who renounce ties with international terrorism and the use of force while accepting the constitution of the nation? What are the candidates' ideas for governing Afghanistan; how, for example, should the provincial councils evolve to give a real voice to Afghans across the land? And how can the international community better partner with Afghanistan to achieve peace, justice and economic progress?

In March, President Obama announced a new U.S. strategy that includes a major commitment of American men and women -- civilian and military -- to Afghanistan, as well as important new financial contributions to help accelerate development. We will continue to work with the next Afghan administration to field capable and sufficient Afghan National Army and police units; to support effective government personnel systems; to help combat corruption; to provide financial assistance to key Afghan institutions; to promote agricultural development; to address de! tention issues; to support Afghan-led reconciliation efforts; and to fix contracting practices. All of these efforts must be underpinned by accountability on both sides. The international community looks forward to strengthening its partnership with whichever candidate emerges from the elections, based upon a renewed spirit of cooperation.

So it is not just the Afghan people who need to understand the candidates' platforms and plans. We members of the international community need to know these things, too. The United States is one nation among a great partnership of more than 40 NATO and non-NATO countries that have joined with the people and government of Afghanistan. We have lost our sons and daughters, just as Afghans have, and we have invested significant development assistance during difficult economic times. Our commitment is extraordinary and long term. We are prepared to forge ahead based on common interests and mutual obligations. We stand with absolute impar! tiality regarding who should be president of Afghanistan. But all of u s will benefit from clarity as to what policy goals we should expect from the next administration.

This is an exciting time to be in Afghanistan. Walking through the bazaars of Helmand, Wardak, Kunduz, Herat, Uruzgan, Khost and numerous other provinces where the Afghan people are defending against destabilizing forces, I have seen their hope and thirst for progress. Candidates -- some prominent, some relatively new to the national stage -- are for the most part embracing their responsibility to discuss the issues. Ongoing televised debates remind me that, though we may be separated by barriers of language and culture, the democratic process in Afghanistan is like our own: an intense competition of political ideas to the benefit of the common citizen.

On Aug. 20, Afghan men and women will travel great distances -- in some cases, unfortunately, under threat of attack -- to make their voices heard. In the final weeks of this election season, the Afghan people deserv! e to know the platforms and implementation plans of each candidate. And so do we. The stakes are high and the opportunity great for all of us. The Afghan people and international community must be positioned to move quickly in partnership immediately after the inauguration of Afghanistan's next president. We have no time to lose as we work together to deliver peace, justice, economic opportunity and regional understanding.

It is time for a serious debate.

The writer is the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. He has served five years in the country in civilian and military capacities, including as commander of international forces from 2005 to 2007.

Marines in 'Stan - The Fight Today

Marines In Afghanistan Using Ancient Fortress As Base

CNN Sunday Morning, 7:00 AM

T.J. HOLMES: Now, U.S. Marines have been battling the Taliban for control of southern Afghanistan's rural area. One group of Marines is holding an ancient castle attacked over the years, with everything from arrows to air strikes.

BROOKE BALDWIN: We sent our own Ivan Watson there. He has this exclusive look at how a fledgling struggling local government is coming together behind the ancient mud walls.

I! VAN WATSON: There is a timeless quality to Afghanistan. Sometimes, you really feel like you're going back in time when you visit here and now more than ever. Because we're walking on the ramparts of a centuries-old Afghan fortress. A mud and brick fortress complete with what look like arrow loops of some sort.

And the remarkable thing about this structure is that the U.S. Marines, a modern fighting force, are using this as a military base. They are protecting themselves behind these walls from insurgents who have been operating out in the fields and the canals and gullies out there.

The insurgents have fired rocket-propelled grenades at this location. They fired small arms as well. And they've lobbed deadly mortars into this castle.

We had a loud night in the castle last night because the marines were hunting for a suspected insurgent mortar team out in the fields beyond the walls. And to help the patrols out there, they were firing illumination rounds fro! m mortar tubes, that was deafening.

Anyway, the work that's bein g done here is so important because there's an experiment underway. Within the walls of the castle are the beginnings of a fledgling district government, with representatives from the ministry of health and education, as well as Afghan National Police officers and Afghan National Army soldiers, and they are part of the ticket for an exit of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. It's got to grow up here, this local government, in an area that was, until just a few weeks ago, controlled by the Taliban.

And that makes the work that these men are doing right here in this guard tower so important. They are protecting this experiment in establishing an Afghan government from the insurgents in the fields just out there.

PFC. RICHARD REED, U.S. MARINE CORPS: The day before yesterday, we had a couple of mortar rounds hit right outside the post and also inside the castle.

WATSON: And have you had to retaliate? Have you actually seen any of the fighters?

REED: Yes. We h! ad a man suspected of being the fort observer for them right outside here, probably about 1,200 meters.

CPL. ADAM TRANTHAM, U.S. MARINE CORPS: My job here is to help the Delta Company with their indirect fire. So, I have a part in help to deter these mortars that they have been firing at us, sir. We came up here and spotted their forward observer. We returned fire. And, hopefully, we deterred them.

WATSON: Make no mistake. This is incredibly, difficult, dangerous work.

And the Marines who have been here with the Delta Company of the 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion have not had an easy time over the past two weeks. Three of their comrades have been killed in two separate incidents during what has been the bloodiest month yet of this eight-year war in Afghanistan. The U.S. has had record losses this month as have NATO forces. This is the season for fighting, summer in Afghanistan, and the summer is far from over.

Ivan Watson, CNN, Khan Neshi n in southern Afghanistan.

Where are the Afghans ??

Dearth Of Capable Afghan Forces Complicates U.S. Mission In South

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post
July 25, 2009

GARMSIR, Afghanistan -- "Six, you've got six," Marine 1st Lt. Justin Grieco told his military police training team, counting the handful of Afghan police officers present for a patrol in this volatile region of southern Afghanistan.

The men filed out! of the dusty compound gate into the baking afternoon sun. On the patrol, U.S. military police officers outnumbered the Afghans two to one -- a reflection of the severe shortfall in Afghan security forces working with Marines in Helmand province.

President Obama's strategy for Afghanistan is heavily dependent upon raising more capable local security forces, but the myriad challenges faced by mentors such as Grieco underscore just how limiting a factor that is -- especially in the Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan.

The extent of the push by 4,500 Marines into Taliban strongholds of southern Helmand will be determined, to a degree, by whether there are enough qualified Afghan forces to partner with and eventually leave behind to protect Afghan civilians. Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, commander of the Marine forces here, said urgent efforts are underway to dispatch additional Afghan forces to Helmand.

But here in Helmand's Garmsir district -- as i! n much of the south -- Afghan forces remain few in number, as well as short of training, equipment and basic supplies such as fuel and ammunition. Some Afghans quit because they are reluctant to work in the violent south; others are expelled because of drug use. The Afghan troops here, heavily dependent on Western forces, are hesitating to take on greater responsibilities -- and, in some cases, are simply refusing to do so.

The Afghan National Police officers mentored by Grieco's team, for example, are resisting a U.S. military effort to have them expand to checkpoints in villages outside the town center of Garmsir as the Marines push farther south, taking with them the Afghan Border Police officers, who currently man some of those stations.

"Without the Marines, we cannot secure the stations," said Mohammed Agha, deputy commander of the roughly 80 Garmsir police officers. "We can't go to other villages because of the mines, and some people have weapons hidden in their houses. We can't go out of Garmsir, or we will be killed."

The border police, too, have resisted taking up new positions. Col. Gula Agha Amiri, executive officer of the 7th Afghan Border Police, complained of his unit's lack of body armor and chronic shortages of ammunition and fuel. "If we have contact with the enemy, we can't fight for more than two hours," he said.

Both police forces have lost dozens of men to insurgent attacks in recent years, the Afghan officers said.

U.S. Army Capt. Michael Repasky, chief of the team that mentors the border police here, remains frustrated at the lack of logistical support. "I've been here five months and haven't been able to figure out why they aren't getting fuel," he said, explaining that the police receive fuel perhaps every two weeks and then run out.

That, in turn, makes the border police officers reluctant to move beyond their headquarters in the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, he said. "If they move farther from Lash, it will be harder for them to get what they nee! d. They want a roof over their heads, hot meals, time to rest," Repask y said. "I can encourage them to start a new checkpoint. But the commander can say no, and there's nothing I can do about it."

The overall shortage of security forces in southern Afghanistan exacerbates such tensions. There are about 13,600 Afghan soldiers and 11,000 police officers in the south, and each force is short of 4,000 men for positions that have been authorized but not filled. U.S. military officers say Afghan forces should be doubled to provide adequate security in the south.

"The U.S. force is growing down here, but the Afghan force is not growing nearly as fast," said Col. Bill Hix, who until recently led the Afghan Regional Security Integration Command in Kandahar, another large southern province, overseeing the development of police and soldiers in southern Afghanistan. "We have people who are bleeding and dying, and we need to look hard at how we generate [Afghan] forces."

The shortages of capable Afghan forces means they usually assist wit! h searches and security on operations planned and led by Marines, the mentors said. "Right now, they're just happy with us telling them 'Go there, do this,' " said Stephen Woods, a civilian police adviser with the Marine mentoring team.

There are exceptions. Two police officers buying lunch in Garmsir this week observed a drug sale, shadowed the dealer, detained him and seized 30 bundles of heroin, Grieco said.

Gaining approval for increasing the size of the Afghan forces -- which requires international endorsement -- has been a maddening process, said Hix, comparing it to "negotiating a peace treaty."

Even after such approval, many hurdles remain, particularly in the south, he said.

"It's a challenge to get people down here," said Hix, adding that units that deploy to southern Afghanistan often suffer higher rates of unauthorized absences. "The guys think there is a monster down here." Drug use in the forces is another problem, according to U.S. and! Afghan officers. "We lose 5 to 10 percent of every class in the polic e force to opiate use," Hix said.

Training the police and army poses other challenges, he said. Police officers and soldiers -- the vast majority of them illiterate villagers -- require extensive training, but during a war only so many can be pulled away from their jobs at any one time.

Building training and other facilities for the forces and providing them with equipment remain slow because of red tape and contracting rules, he said. It takes 120 to 180 days to start work on a training facility and often more than a year to 18 months to field new equipment, such as the 1,000 Humvees on order for the Afghan army in the south. "We can't swing the money cannon quickly enough to adapt," Hix said.

Still, Hix said, the Afghan forces have made significant progress in the south. In the past year, the training capacity for regional police has doubled and the rate of those absent without leave has halved.

Despite the problems, Hix said that replacing foreign ! forces with homegrown ones is the only viable long-term solution, in part because the latter cost far less. "We should not be substituting U.S. troops for Afghans, which is what we are effectively doing now...in trying to secure and stabilize Afghanistan," he wrote in an e-mail.

U.S. and Afghan officers urged greater emphasis on professionalizing the Afghan police, which are at least as critical as the army in a counterinsurgency campaign but have received far fewer resources. Residents also have complained about corruption among police officers, the mentors say.

The police's law-enforcement role in Garmsir is limited because many of the officers are illiterate, Grieco said. "Paperwork, evidence, processing...they don't know how to do it," he said. "You can't get a policeman to take a statement if he can't read and write."

Increasing numbers of residents are coming to the police station to report problems, said Staff Sgt. David Dillon, one of Grieco's! team members. Still, as a patrol moved through the local bazaar, the police barely interacted with civilians, troubling their mentors.

Shopkeepers and residents eyed the patrol silently and did not respond to greetings in Pashto. An Afghan boy swore in English at one of the Marines, who responded: "Go home."

"They're still a little hostile towards us," Woods said. "They will throw rocks. They will give you that look. They don't trust us."

Maleki visits Tomb of Unknowns @ Arlington

Al-Maliki Honors U.S. Sacrifice In Iraq

PM's gesture a departure from tough talk at home

By Ken Dilanian and Aamer Madhani, USA Today
USA Today
July 24, 2009

ARLINGTON, Va. — Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose disparaging comments about U.S. troops have drawn criticism from American officials recently, visited Arlington Cemetery on Thursday and laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns.Flanked by honor guards from each branch of the armed forces, al-Maliki stood respectfully at attention during a brief ceremony.

After a 19-gun salute, the U.S. Army Band played the national anthems for Iraq and the United States. A single bugler then played Taps.

Al-Maliki left without making public comment, as is common practice at such ceremonies.

The display of gratitude toward the more than 4,300 U.S. troops who have died in the Iraq war was a departure from al-Maliki's recent tone — and a potentially risky political move for him back in Iraq.

Prior to last month's deadline for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq's cities, al-Maliki trumpeted the occasion as a "victory" for Iraq over the American "occupiers." He also compared the withdrawal to Iraq's 1920 revolt against British colonial rule. In a speech on June 30, which he dubbed "National Sovereignty Day," he failed to mention the U.S. military's role in helping bring down violence in Iraq.

Ambassador Christopher Hill, the U.S. envoy to Iraq, told USA TODAY last week that al-Maliki's comments have been "at times tough to take."

Al-Maliki, who met President Obama in Washington earlier this week and spoke with Pentagon officials Thursday, has been trying to distance himself from the U.S. presence in Iraq and burnish his image as a nationalist ahead of national elections in January.

Both U.S. officials and Iraqi political allies of al-Maliki in Baghdad said the prime minister's decision to visit Arlington was a genuine gesture.

Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said the visit was not the result of prompting by Americans. "Maliki requested the visit to Arlington Cemetery in order to pay tribute to the servicemembers who died in Iraq," Odierno said in a statement.

Ali al-Allaq, a member of Iraq's parliament and political ally of al-Maliki's, said that some of his comments have been blown out of proportion. He's said that al-Maliki has commended American troops over the years for their sacrifice and noted that the prime minister thanked the U.S. during his Wednesday news conference with President Obama.

"All Iraqi people appreciate all that the U.S. has done," Allaq told USA TODAY. "We thank the Americans for all they've done, and now it is time for them to play a different role."

Al-Maliki also understands that he still needs U.S. support, said Ghassan Atiyyah, the executive director for the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy, a London-based non-profit group. There are still about 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, and their role is critical to training Iraqi troops and maintaining security as al-Maliki deals with unresolved political issues, hesaid.

"Maliki knows playing the anti-American card has proven in recent Iraqi history to be an effective strategy," Atiyyah said. "(But) without the Americans' involvement, he knows there could be chaos."

He cited several remaining threats to Iraq's security including potential meddling from neighboring Iran and tensions between Kurds and Arabs over disputed territory in northern Iraq.

At a separate event earlier Thursday, al-Maliki said there could be some flexibility to a security agreement signed in December that mandates the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. "If Iraqi forces need more training and support, we will re-examine the agreement at that time, based on our own national needs," he said.

The 2011 deadline was insisted upon by al-Maliki's government in negotiations with President Bush's administration last fall. Obama has said — and repeated again in al-Maliki's presence Wednesday — that the withdrawal date will not be modified.
Madhani reported from Baghdad.

Press Release from Camp Leatherneck

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 19, 2009
PRESS RELEASE 09-07
CAMP LEATHERNECK, Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan –

Afghan National Army soldiers and U.S. Marines from Regimental Combat Team 3, Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, conducted a raid on a known insurgent stronghold July 18 in the town of Lakari, Garmsir District.

The raid force uncovered several weapons caches – including supplies used in making improvised explosive devices – and a stockpile of Afghan National Army uniforms, used by insurgents in ambush attacks. The force also included members of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit supported by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and discovered a significant quantity of illegal drugs, which help fund the insurgents.

There were no reports of ANA or civilian casualties, or damage to civilian property.

Tom Friedman & Afghanistan

Teacher, Can We Leave Now? No.
By Thomas L. Friedman
New York Times
July 19, 2009

Pushghar, Afghanistan--I confess, I find it hard to come to Afghanistan and not ask: Why are we here? Who cares about the Taliban? Al Qaeda is gone. And if its leaders come back, well, that’s why God created cruise missiles.

But every time I start writing that column, something stills my hand. This week it was something very powerful. I watched Greg Mortenson, the famed author of “Three Cups of Tea,” open one of his schools for girls in this remote Afghan village in the Hindu Kush mountains. I must say, after witnessing the delight in the faces of those little Afghan girls crowded three to a desk waiting to learn, I found it very hard to write, “Let’s just get out of here.”

Indeed, Mortenson’s efforts remind us what the essence of the “war on terrorism” is about. It’s about the war of ideas within Islam — a war between religious zealots who glorify martyrdom and want to keep Islam untouched by modernity and isolated from other faiths, with its women disempowered, and those who want to embrace modernity, open Islam to new ideas and empower Muslim women as much as men. America’s invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were, in part, an effort to create the space for the Muslim progressives to fight and win so that the real engine of change, something that takes nine months and 21 years to produce — a new generation — can be educated and raised differently.

Which is why it was no accident that Adm. Mike Mullen, the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — spent half a day in order to reach Mortenson’s newest school and cut the ribbon. Getting there was fun. Our Chinook helicopter threaded its way between mountain peaks, from Kabul up through the Panjshir Valley, before landing in a cloud of dust at the village of Pushghar. Imagine if someone put a new, one-story school on the moon, and you’ll appreciate the rocky desolateness of this landscape.

But there, out front, was Mortenson, dressed in traditional Afghan garb. He was surrounded by bearded village elders and scores of young Afghan boys and girls, who were agog at the helicopter, and not quite believing that America’s “warrior chief” — as Admiral Mullen’s title was loosely translated into Urdu — was coming to open the new school.

While the admiral passed out notebooks, Mortenson told me why he has devoted his life to building 131 secular schools for girls in Pakistan and another 48 in Afghanistan: “The money is money well spent. These are secular schools that will bring a new generation of kids that will have a broader view of the world. We focus on areas where there is no education. Religious extremism flourishes in areas of isolation and conflict.

“When a girl gets educated here and then becomes a mother, she will be much less likely to let her son become a militant or insurgent,” he added. “And she will have fewer children. When a girl learns how to read and write, one of the first things she does is teach her own mother. The girls will bring home meat and veggies, wrapped in newspapers, and the mother will ask the girl to read the newspaper to her and the mothers will learn about politics and about women who are exploited.”

It is no accident, Mortenson noted, that since 2007, the Taliban and its allies have bombed, burned or shut down more than 640 schools in Afghanistan and 350 schools in Pakistan, of which about 80 percent are schools for girls. This valley, controlled by Tajik fighters, is secure, but down south in Helmand Province, where the worst fighting is today, the deputy minister of education said that Taliban extremists have shut 75 of the 228 schools in the last year. This is the real war of ideas. The Taliban want public mosques, not public schools. The Muslim militants recruit among the illiterate and impoverished in society, so the more of them the better, said Mortenson.

This new school teaches grades one through six. I asked some girls through an interpreter what they wanted to be when they grow up: “Teacher,” shouted one. “Doctor,” shouted another. Living here, those are the only two educated role models these girls encounter. Where were they going to school before Mortenson’s Central Asia Institute and the U.S. State Department joined with the village elders to get this secular public school built? “The mosque,” the girls said.

Mortenson said he was originally critical of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he’s changed his views: “The U.S. military has gone through a huge learning curve. They really get it. It’s all about building relationships from the ground up, listening more and serving the people of Afghanistan.”

So there you have it. In grand strategic terms, I still don’t know if this Afghan war makes sense anymore. I was dubious before I arrived, and I still am. But when you see two little Afghan girls crouched on the front steps of their new school, clutching tightly with both arms the notebooks handed to them by a U.S. admiral — as if they were their first dolls — it’s hard to say: “Let’s just walk away.” Not yet.

Gen Cartwright on Success in Afghanistan

Afghans’ Attitude Will Be Measure of Success, Vice Chairman Gen Cartwright Says

By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 9, 2009 – A key measurement of success in Afghanistan will be the attitude of Afghans affected by U.S.-led operations, the military’s second-ranking military officer said today.

Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan elevates the civilian population as a main determinant of success or failure, much as it did in Iraq.

“I believe personally that one of our key metrics for success will be over the next few months to see whether or not there is a shift in the attitude of the local residents,” Cartwright said. The committee is considering the general’s reappointment.

Cartwright fleshed out the “clear, hold, build” strategy under way in Afghanistan. The latter elements of the strategy emphasize the role civilians play in establishing stability.

Articulating how local attitudes could be gauged, Cartwright said a favorable view of U.S. and multinational forces could come in the form Afghans providing intelligence or other resources.

“If they start supporting us with intelligence, with the giving of their own sons and daughters in the fight, and that they see there is more value in being able to produce crops rather than warriors, and that they can be sustained in that type of a lifestyle, then we will have an opportunity to turn the corner,” he said.

The general advised that the Marines engaged in a joint operation with Afghan forces in the Helmand River valley pay attention to the sentiment in villages and towns they operate in. Now in its eighth day, some 4,000 Marines and 650 Afghan security forces are engaged in Operation Khanjar, which translates to “Strike of the Sword“ the biggest military offensive since President Barack Obama announced a new Afghanistan strategy in March.

“I think those are key metrics that we have to watch as the Marines move into Helmand, and followed by the [Army’s] Strykers as they move in on their flank,” Cartwright said.

At a briefing with Pentagon reporters yesterday, the commander overseeing the operation described how the interaction between U.S. Marines and local Afghans are playing out.

Anticipating that local residents would be curious about the Marines’ intentions, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson, commander of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, established a requirement: Company commanders must hold a “shura,” or meeting, with local elders within one day of arriving.

“The focus of this operation from the very beginning has been on the people, not the enemy,” Nicholson said. “And I know that may sound very strange, and I got some raised eyebrows, even with talking to Marines. On the way, we'll take care of the Taliban. But get to the people.”

The “clear” phase of the three-stage approach refers to the type of mission the Marines undertook when Operation Khanjar launched, with the brigade fanning out across the southern Afghanistan region during the early morning hours of July 2. The strategy was two-fold: overwhelm opposing forces while saving civilian lives.

Current operations in Helmand are fundamentally different from previous missions, in that Marines are remaining behind to protect those villages as the remainder of forces moves through, Cartwright said. He added that forces have been successful in avoiding civilian casualties in the ongoing “clear” phase.

“Our approach here is to win their hearts and minds,” Cartwright said. “And we can't do that by having unnecessary civilian casualties.”